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A PROPOSED ANTITRUST APPROACH TO THE
CONDUCT OF RETAILERS, DEALERS, AND OTHER
RESELLERS
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr.*
Abstract: The market power of retailers, resellers, and dealers has increased substantially
in recent years as the result of innovations in distribution such as the superstores, mass
merchandisers, and warehouse clubs. Consequently, the balance of power in many industries
has begun to shift from the supplier to the resale level. Although courts have well-developed
means of analyzing the competitive conduct of suppliers and consumers, they have been
unable to decide how to treat resellers' competitive conduct. This Article proposes the
adoption of a traditional antitrust approach, the "ancillary restraints analysis," to the conduct
of resellers. Under this approach, courts would recognize that a reseller is engaged in a
partnership with its suppliers to deliver goods and services in the most efficient manner
possible. Courts should preclude restrictions that are unrelated to efficiency-enhancing
objectives or are broader than required to accomplish these objectives. Such an approach will
encourage resellers to act more efficiently, and will deter them from taking actions that limit
the range of products and services available to consumers.
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INTRODUCTION

This Article proposes a new method of analyzing the antitrust
implications of conduct by retailers, dealers, and other firms that
purchase products for resale to consumers. As intermediaries between
suppliers and consumers, resellers have the potential both to restrict and
promote competition. Consumers benefit when resellers pressure their
suppliers to lower their prices and adopt more efficient methods of
distribution. Resellers may, however, hurt consumers by using their
market power to eliminate more efficient firms from the relevant market.
In cases brought under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,' federal
courts have been unable to distinguish between the beneficial and
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994). Section 1 of the Act prohibits any "contract, combination... or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade" and is used to attack anti-competitive conduct by a group of
resellers. 15 U.S.C. § 1. Section 2 prohibits monopolization and attempts to monopolize and is used
to attack anti-competitive conduct by individual resellers with monopoly power. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
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adverse aspects of resellers' conduct. The courts' uncertainty has
profound adverse implications for the U.S. economy. As resellers'
market power has increased in recent years, they have acquired an even
greater ability to act for good or for ill. The federal courts' current
approach has discouraged resellers from engaging in conduct that could
benefit consumers while encouraging them to take actions adverse to
consumers' interests.
Resellers' market power began to increase in the mid-1980s, as they
introduced "superstores" to meet consumer demands for greater value
and convenience. The superstores allowed consumers to engage in "onestop shopping" for a variety of brands at low prices. In the retail industry,
"category killers," including Toys "R" Us, Barnes & Noble, Home
Depot, OfficeMax, and Circuit City, now offer a wide selection of
discounted products within specialized categories;' mass merchandisers
such as Wal-Mart, Kmart, and Target provide consumers with
department-store variety at "everyday low prices, 3 and warehouse clubs
like Best Buy and Sam's Club give consumers an alternative for no-frills,
low-cost shopping.4 The trend to one-stop shopping, which began in the
retail industry, is now spreading to other markets. In the automobile
industry, CarMax and AutoNation USA have acquired hundreds of
dealerships and consolidated them into superstores where consumers can
shop for a variety of automobile models.5 In the motion picture industry,
"super-cinemas" have made it possible for patrons to pick from as many
as thirty different movies in one location.6 In the health care industry,
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) allow consumers to use a

2. See In re Toys "R" Us, No. 9273, 1997 FTC LEXIS 284, at *5 (FTC Sept. 25, 1997); Roger
Lowenstein, Inside the Staples Deal: Chaos Upstream, Wall St. J., Mar. 20, 1997, at Cl; Kevin
Mundt, W7') , Sears Survived-and Ward's and Woolworth's Didn 't, Wall St. J., July 28, 1997, at
A18; Joseph Pereira & Greg Jaffe, Office Depot-StaplesRuling Could Spark Other Deals, Wall St.
J., July 2, 1997, at B4.
3. See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997); Robert Berner, At Christmas,
Retailers Are Like Kids Who Ask Santa Clausfor a Pony, Wall St. J., Oct.27, 1997, at A1; Carletta
Y. Coleman, How GrocersAre FightingGiantRivals, Wall St. J., Mar. 27, 1997, at B 1.
4. See Toys "R" Us, 1997 FTC LEXIS 284, at *8.
5. See Rebecca Blumenstein, GM Speeds Its Makeover of Car-DealershipNetwork, Wall St. J.,
June 6, 1997, at A3; Angelo B. Henderson & Valerie Reitman, Detroit Strikes Back in Dealership
Revolution, Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1997, at BI; Dan McGinn, A Cream Puff or a Lemon? The UsedCar Superstores May Face Some Speed Bumps, Newsweek, Mar. 10, 1997, at 48. After
consolidating more than 190 dealers, AutoNation now has a projected $11 billion in annual sales. Id.
6. See Kevin Helliker, Monster Movie TheatersInvade the Cinema Landscape, Wall St. J., May
13,1997, at BI.
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single entity to access the resources of physicians in all relevant
specialties.
As a result of these innovations in distribution, the balance of power
in many markets has begun to shift from the supplier to the resale level.
Superstores have set in motion a cycle particularly adverse to their
competitors. Because of their size, superstores have the leverage to
obtain low prices from suppliers that are impossible for smaller
competitors to match. As a result, many smaller firms have been forced
out of business, thereby increasing the superstores' market power and
relative advantage over their remaining competitors. As one observer
recently pointed out, "[if] they're used to shopping at Wal-Mart, who's
going to go back to the little comer store?" 7 Independent bookstores are
closing as their customers flock to superstores such as Barnes & Noble,8
thousands of automobile dealers are expected to shut their doors as the
automobile superstores gain market share,9 and 3,000 of the nation's
5,000 movie theaters may close within the next few years because of
competition from the super-cinemas.'I
Consumers have benefited from the lower prices offered by
superstores, but they have also been hurt by the consolidation that has
occurred at the resale level. In many markets, consumers now have fewer
alternatives to the superstores. Book buyers, for example, can purchase
bestsellers for a lower price at Barnes & Noble, but they are finding it
more difficult to find comer bookstores that carry less well-known
titles. In certain cases large resellers have taken affirmative steps to
deprive consumers of alternative goods or services. The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) recently found that Toys "R" Us has attempted to
limit consumer access to discounted name-brand toys by pressuring
7. Thomas W. Gerdel, Auto Dealers Face a Range of Challenges, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov.
23, 1997, at HI (comments of Mac Gordon, Senior Editor, Ward's Dealer Business).
8. See, e.g., G. Bruce Knecht, Book Superstores Bring Hollywood-Like Risks to Publishing
Business, Wall St. J., May 29, 1997, at Al (pointing out that independent bookstores are going out of
business as they find it impossible to compete with book superstores).
9. See Blumenstein, supra note 5, at A3; Henderson & Reitman, supranote 5, at B 1.
10. See Helliker, supra note 6, at B1. As one observer has pointed out, "[i]n
10 years across the
country, you're only going to be left with megaplexes." Id. (comments of Bruce Olson, President,
Marcus Corporation theater division); see also Michele Fuetsch, Independent Pet Store Operators
Are Struggling to Compete with the Burgeoning Ranks ofthe National Superstores in a Battle That
Could Be Billed as... Chihuahuas vs. GreatDanes, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 28, 1997, at HI
(stating that, in pet store market, 40-60% of small independent stores have closed as result of
competition with superstores).
11. See Knecht, supra note 8,at Al.
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suppliers not to sell certain toys to warehouse clubs. 2 HMOs have been
accused of compromising patient care by refusing to do business with
physicians who fail3 to follow strict quotas for the number of patients they
must see in a day.'
Courts have well-developed means of analyzing the antitrust
implications of conduct both at the upstream supplier level and at the
downstream level where a product is used by consumers. Consumers,
courts have concluded, should be the beneficiaries of antitrust
enforcement, while suppliers should be the object of such enforcement.
Because consumer welfare is the primary objective of the Sherman Act,
courts should monitor suppliers' conduct to insure that they do not raise
prices or reduce output to consumers' detriment. 4 Courts, however, have
been unable to decide how to treat the competitive conduct of resellers.
Because resellers operate as both purchasers and sellers of products,
courts have been unsure whether to afford them the protections available
to consumers or regulate them in the same manner as suppliers.
The approach this Article proposes for the analysis of resellers'
conduct is based on a concept that was first set forth exactly 100 years
ago. The "ancillary restraints" analysis was developed by Judge (later
Chief Justice and President) William Howard Taft in the 1898 case
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.' That decision has been
characterized as "one of the greatest, if not the greatest, antitrust opinions
in the history of the law.' 6 In Addyston Pipe, Judge Taft distinguished
between "naked" restraints on competition, which should be precluded
under the Sherman Act because they are unrelated to any efficiencyenhancing purpose, and "ancillary" restraints, which should be permitted
because they advance the parties' legitimate efficiency objectives. 7 Until
recently, the ancillary restraints analysis was largely ignored in antitrust

12. See In re Toys "R" Us, No. 9273, 1997 FTC LEXIS 284 (FTC Sept. 25, 1997).
13. See Robert M. Goldberg, What's Happened to the Healing Process?, wall St. J., June 18,
1997, at A22.
14. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas

Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210,228 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678
F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 Mich.
L. Rev. 1696, 1703 (1986) (stating that "however you slice the legislative history, the dominant
theme is the protection of consumers from overcharges").
15. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).

16. Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox:A Policy at War with Itself26 (1978).
17. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 283.
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has recently undergone a revival in the
cases. The concept, however,
8
courts.
federal
lower
This Article describes a variation of the ancillary restraints approach
that should prove effective for the analysis of resellers' conduct. Courts
should recognize that a reseller is engaged in a partnership with its
suppliers to deliver goods and services to consumers in the most efficient
manner possible. Courts should uphold a restriction on competition
initiated by a reseller if it is reasonably related to the efficiencyenhancing objectives of that partnership. However, courts should
preclude any restriction that is unrelated to such legitimate objectives or
is broader than required to accomplish those objectives.
The proposed approach would be relatively easy for courts and
enforcement agencies to apply, and it would provide clearer guidance to
resellers on the legality of particular restraints. Such an approach will
encourage resellers to engage in conduct that lowers prices and delivers
goods and services to consumers more efficiently. At the same time, it
will deter resellers from taking actions that limit the range of products
and services available to consumers.
Part II of this Article describes the increased market power of resellers
in the United States and the ways in which resellers can use their power
both to benefit and harm consumers. Part III explains why the current
approach of the courts is inadequate for the antitrust analysis of resellers'
conduct. Part IV proposes a new antitrust approach to such conduct, and
Part V gives examples of how the courts can apply the approach in
specific cases.

18. See SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 970 (10th Cir. 1994) (permitting
membership restrictions of Visa credit card system on grounds that they were "reasonably related to
Visa USA's operation and no broader than necessary to effectuate the association's business");
National Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 605 (llth Cir. 1986) (upholding
"interchange fee" among banks in credit card system on grounds that fee helped insure universal
acceptance of card); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985)
(applying rule of reason to noncompetition agreement between neighboring stores because
agreement was necessary for effectiveness of their cooperative marketing program).
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II.

THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF RESELLERS' MARKET
POWER

A.

Beneficial Effects ofResale Power

Firms that purchase products for resale could not survive in many
markets today without enhancing consumer services. Consumers now
have several alternatives for bypassing resellers and purchasing directly
from suppliers, including catalogues, company-owned outlets, and
Internet sales sites.' Unless they receive some added value, consumers
will not be willing to purchase products from intermediaries." Thus,
resellers have become increasingly focused on improving the efficiency
of their distribution systems in order to provide consumers with benefits
they cannot obtain on their own.
Large resellers with significant leverage in their markets can benefit
consumers by requiring suppliers to achieve their own upstream
efficiencies. The resellers can then pass on a portion of the upstream cost
savings to their customers. For example, the President of Acco, a unit of
American Brands that supplies the superstores with a large amount of
merchandise, has conceded that pressure from resellers has forced his
company to lower its prices and become more efficient.2' In response to
the demands of large retailers such as Barnes & Noble, book publishers
are also reducing their costs and providing more favorable pricing to
customers. 22
Large resellers have the advantage of economies of scale that allow
them to achieve their own efficiencies at the resale level. Resale
consolidation has eliminated redundancies that add significant costs to
the distribution of goods and services. By combining independent
distributorships, for example, automobile dealers can avoid duplicate
inventories and transportation, thereby reducing the cost of Americanmade cars by thousands of dollars. 3 Large resellers are also sufficiently
19. See Henderson & Reitman. supra note 5, at B1.
20. As Don Keithly, a partner of J.D. Powers & Associates, recently pointed out with respect to
automobile dealers: "Ifthe franchise system does survive in the next ten years, it will be because it
accommodated consumers, not dictated to them." McGraw, supranote 5, at 54.
21. See Lowenstein, supranote 2, at Cl.
22. See Knecht, supranote 8, at Al.
23. It has been estimated that redundant elements of the distribution systems of General Motors,
Ford, and Chrysler add thousands of dollars to the cost of an automobile. See Blumenstein, supra
note 5, at A3.
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capitalized to afford various efficiency-enhancing investments.
Superstores have invested large amounts in computer systems that allow
them to order a broad range of products as needed by customers. 24
Finally, by virtue of their size and financial capability, large resellers can
provide consumers with one-stop shopping for a variety of suppliers'
products. For instance, office supply superstores such as Office Depot
and Staples allow consumers to select from a broad array of office
supply products.25 New automobile superstores give customers the ability
to comparison-shop among several different brands of automobiles at a
single location. 26 Super-cinemas not only provide customers with the
latest in sound and screen technology, but also give patrons a wider
choice of movies, ranging from traditional Hollywood "first-runs" to
specialty foreign and independent films.2
Large resellers have even acted as a catalyst for general price
deflation. The court in FTC v. Staples, Inc. 21 pointed out that office
supply superstores have "caused a general decrease in the price of office
products across the board. 29 Some commentators have concluded that
the efficiencies effected by superstores have contributed to a "spreading
anti-inflationary mentality among individual and corporate consumers."30
Resale efficiencies need not only be available to the largest firms in a
particular market. By forming joint ventures with their competitors,
24. See, e.g., Pereira & Jaffe, supra note 2, at B4 (describing investments in computer systems by
office supply superstores). Some of the new automobile superstores have developed automated
systems that allow customers to look up the price and location of any car in inventory, arrange
financing, order an extended service plan, and contact an insurer. See Gerdel, supra note 7, at HI.
25. See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1069 (D.D.C. 1997).
26. See Angelo B. Henderson, Ford Explores Idea ofJoiningDealers,Wall St. J., May 12, 1997,
at A2.
27. See Helliker, supra note 6, at BI. One customer has compared the difference between the new
super-cinemas and traditional theaters to the difference between first-class and coach travel on
airlines. Id.; see also John Seabrook, The Big Sellout, New Yorker, Get. 20 & 27, 1997, at 182, 190
("The moviegoer who likes 'art house' films no longer has to go to art houses (which by and large
don't exist anymore) to see them. 'Sling Blade' and 'Shine' and 'Cinema Paradiso' play next to 'Air
Force One' at the multiplex.").
28. 970 F. Supp. 1066.
29. Id. at 1093.
30. Jacob M. Schlesinger & Bob Davis, With Wages Rising and Prices Steaav, Can Profits Stay
Strong?, Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 1997, at Al (explaining how discounters such as Home Depot forced
manufacturers of storm doors to offset wage increases through efficiencies that allow manufacturers
to avoid price increases); see also Jacob M. Schlesinger, Wholesale Prices DroppedAgain in June,
Wall St. J., July 14, 1997, at A2 (stating that new computer technology in wholesale distribution has
been credited with contributing to general decline in wholesale inflation rate during 1997).
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smaller resellers can obtain economies of scale comparable to those
available to large resellers. Purchasing cooperatives give smaller retailers
the leverage necessary to obtain the types of discounts offered to the
superstores. The cooperatives also allow smaller firms to reduce costs by
eliminating redundant and overlapping purchasing functions. Finally, by
allowing smaller resellers to pool their capital resources, buying groups
facilitate the investments in systems and facilities necessary for such
resellers to access a wider variety of products. In fact, in Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,3 the
U.S. Supreme Court identified these efficiencies as a rationale for
applying a more permissive antitrust standard to purchasing
cooperatives.32
B.

Adverse Effects of Resale Power

As a result of their increased market power, resellers now have a
greater ability to limit competition as well as enhance their efficiency in
providing consumer services. Many resellers now control a significant
portion of the market for certain suppliers' products. Indeed, some
resellers could force suppliers out of business simply by refusing to
purchase from them. Thus, many suppliers have no choice but to accede
to resellers' terms of doing business. In certain cases, resellers have used
their leverage to force suppliers to take actions that are detrimental to
consumers. In some markets, fewer products and services are available
because of resellers' demands. In the Toys "R" Us case, an administrative judge found that the superstore had used its purchasing power to
induce Mattel, Hasbro, and several other toy manufacturers to cease
selling name-brand toys to warehouse clubs. 33 The book superstores have
forced publishers to concentrate more on potential "blockbusters" than
on minor titles that are of interest to a smaller number of customers.34 In
the health care industry, some HMOs have threatened "to 'lay-off'

31. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
32. Id. at 295. The Health Care Statements issued by the Department of Justice and the FTC
recognize that most purchasing arrangements among hospitals or other health care providers do not
raise significant antitrust concerns because such collaborative activities allow the participants to
achieve efficiencies that will benefit consumers. See U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n,
Statements ofAntitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care (1996), reprintedin 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,153 (Sept. 5, 1996).
33. See In re Toys "R" Us, No. 9273, 1997 LEXIS 284 (FTC Sept. 25, 1997).
34. See Knecht, supranote 8,at Al.
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doctors-kicking them out of a plan-if they fail to hold down costs or
hit their quota of patients."35 Because most doctors cannot afford to
refuse to deal with local HMOs, they have been forced to reduce the time
they spend with patients, thereby potentially compromising the quality of
their care.36
Smaller resellers also now have an enhanced ability to restrict
competition. Such resellers can obtain significant market power by
forming purchasing cooperatives with their competitors. If the
cooperatives have enough members, they can exert as much pressure on
suppliers as the largest resellers. Furthermore, current members of a
cooperative can restrict competition at the resale level by denying their
rivals a reasonable opportunity to join the group. If a buying group
already includes most of the resellers in the relevant market, it may be
impossible for non-members to form another group that is just as
effective in obtaining lower prices and achieving certain economies of
scale.
III. DEFICIENCIES IN THE COURTS' ANALYSIS OF
RESELLERS' CONDUCT
Federal courts have failed to develop an antitrust theory that draws a
clear dividing line between the beneficial and adverse effects of resellers'
conduct. As a result, resellers are uncertain as to the legal standards
courts may use in judging four types of conduct in which resellers
typically engage: (a) negotiating prices and other terms of sale,
(b) selecting suppliers, (c) forming and administering buying cooperatives, and (d) pointing out to suppliers deficiencies in the performance of other resellers. The uncertainty in the state of the law makes
it more likely that resellers will miscalculate, thus avoiding conduct that
could benefit consumers while engaging in practices that unduly restrict
competition.
A.

NegotiatingPrices and Other Terms of Sale

Antitrust law can unduly interfere with resellers' negotiation of the
most favorable possible prices and other terms of sale from their
suppliers. Certain commentators have pointed out that when there is a
35. Goldberg, supranote 13, at A22.
36. Id.
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single purchaser in the relevant market, it should not be allowed to use its
monopoly power to increase its profits by inducing suppliers to sell at a
price below the competitive level for the relevant product.37 Under such
an approach, resellers with a large market share could be found liable for
attempting to reduce prices below what a court might deem a "fair"
competitive level.
Just as a single monopolist can use its leverage to depress artificially
the prices it pays to its suppliers, a group of oligopolists, acting together,
can use their collective market power for this purpose.3 8 This ability puts
even relatively small resellers at risk of antitrust liability when they form
buying groups. Indeed, some courts have held that joint efforts by
resellers to negotiate prices with their suppliers amount to illegal price
fixing agreements. In Mandeville IslandFarms, Inc. v. American Crystal
Sugar Co., all the sugar refiners in northern California agreed to pay a
uniform price to the growers of sugar beets in the area.39 The Supreme
Court held that the Sherman Act condemns such an agreement, even
though the agreement was among purchasers rather than suppliers and
harmed sellers rather than consumers." Similarly, in National Macaroni
Manufacturers Ass'n v. FTC, the principal domestic manufacturers of
macaroni products specified that they would no longer purchase 100%
durum wheat for their products but instead would only purchase a blend
of durum and other types of wheat.41 The purpose of the agreement was
to reduce the demand, and hence the price, for durum. The Seventh
Circuit found the agreement among the resellers to be an illegal pricefixing arrangement.42

37. See Richard Posner & Frank Easterbrook, Antitrust: Cases, Economic Notes and Other
Materials 148 (2d ed. 1981).
38. See Richard Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 39-53 (1976) (pointing out that
small group of purchasers can form alliance to depress prices paid to suppliers and thus artificially
increase their own profits).
39. 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
40. Ad at 235-36. The Court pointed out that the sugar refiners collectively held monopoly power
in the relevant market and that the sugar beet growers had no alternative outlets for their products.
Id. at 240.
41. 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965).
42. Id at 426-27; see also Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, 541 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1976)
(egg distributors conspired on prices paid to egg producers); Live Poultry Dealers' Protection Ass'n
v. United States, 4 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1924) (buyers' committee negotiated with poultry sellers);
Vandervelde v. Put & Call Brokers & Dealers Ass'n, 344 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (broker
association set uniform discounts for competing members to charge in executing trades).
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In such an environment, resellers cannot be sure of how aggressive
they can be in using their market power when negotiating with their
suppliers. This uncertainty extends not only to large resellers engaged in
individual negotiations but also to small firms attempting to pool their
marketing power in purchasing cooperatives. Courts have thus taken
away one of the greatest means by which resellers can enhance consumer
welfare. Consumer prices likely will rise if resellers are not allowed to
use their leverage freely to force suppliers to enhance their upstream
efficiency. It is critical that federal courts clarify their approach to
resellers' price negotiations so that courts do not continue to deter procompetitive conduct.
B.

Choosing Suppliers

Under the courts' current approach, resellers with significant market
power cannot even be certain of their right to prefer certain suppliers
over others. Some courts and commentators have concluded that the
exercise of monopoly power by purchasers can be as great an evil as the
exercise of such power by sellers. "Monopsony" has been defined as "the
equivalent on the buying side of... monopoly power on the selling
side."43 The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear in several cases
brought under section 2 of the Sherman Act that monopolists may not
arbitrarily refuse to deal with third parties who wish to use their products
or services. The Court emphasized that if a monopolist refuses to allow a
third party to access its resources, that party would have no alternative
and would be completely excluded from the relevant market.' Similarly,
a reseller that constituted the only outlet for a supplier's products could
exclude the supplier from the relevant market by refusing to buy from it.
Thus, under the monopsony theory, resellers with monopoly power could
be deemed to have a corresponding duty to deal with all eligible
suppliers. Indeed, in a recent case Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., the
Second Circuit declined to dismiss a complaint charging a monopoly

43. R. Lipsey et al., Economics 976 (7th ed. 1984).
44. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (finding
antitrust violation when defendant, which controlled three of four skiing mountains in Aspen area,
refused to cooperate with owner of fourth mountain in marketing multi-day, multi-mountain ski
ticket); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (holding that electric company's
refusal to sell electric power in wholesale market to municipalities that operated their own retail
distribution systems was illegal); Lorain Journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (holding
illegal publisher's refusal to sell advertising to parties who patronized local radio station).
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supplier of telephone services with refusing to deal with a potential
supplier.45

In various "exclusive dealing" cases, courts have also considered the
degree to which a dominant purchaser should be required to buy from all
suppliers in a particular market. Under an exclusive dealing arrangement,
a buyer agrees to purchase all of its requirements for a particular product
exclusively from one supplier for a particular period of time. In doing so,
the buyer is agreeing, in effect, not to deal with other potential suppliers
during that time period. Courts and antitrust enforcement agencies have

used a "rule of reason" approach in determining whether exclusive
dealing arrangements should be upheld.4 6 Under the rule of reason, courts
do not determine the legality of a competitive restraint until they have
considered every factor that might conceivably bear on its competitive
purpose or effect, including the defendant's share of the relevant product
and geographic markets.4" It is difficult to predict the outcome of a rule
of reason analysis, because courts have never explained the priority or
weight that should be afforded to its various factors.48 The factors that

have been considered in exclusive dealing cases include the duration of
the agreement,49 the extent to which entry may be deterred in the relevant

45. 95 F.3d 1055 (2d Cir. 1996). For a more complete discussion of the Discon case, see infra
Part VI.
46. Exclusive dealing arrangements are subject to challenge under section 3 of the Clayton Act as
well as under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Because section 3 is limited to arrangements involving
"goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities," exclusive dealing
involving services or other intangibles can only be challenged under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994).
47. In Continental T V.,Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., the Court stated that "[u]nder this rule, the
factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should
be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition." 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); see
also Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against
Vertical Price Fixing, 71 Geo. L.J. 1487, 1489 (1983) (referring to "rule of reason' approach in
which all relevant competitive factors are taken into account").
48. The classic formulation of the rule of reason, set forth by Justice Brandeis in 1918, included
such factors as the circumstances peculiar to the defendant's business, the conditions before and after
the restraint, the nature and purpose of the restraint, and the competitive effects of the restraint. See
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). The Court in Sylvania simply
repeated Justice Brandeis's open-ended formula. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49 n.15. In 1988, in
Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., the Court merely cited Sylvania's broad definition
without any further explanation. 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988).
49. Compare Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir.
1982) (holding invalid exclusive contracts extending for period in excess of 10 years), with Ferguson
v. Greater Pocatello Chamber of Commerce, 848 F.2d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding exclusive
contract extending for only six years).
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market,5" the degree to which other firms employ exclusive dealing,5 ' the
justifications for the exclusivity,52 and the percentage of the market
foreclosed to a supplier's competitors by the arrangement. As the
percentage of the foreclosed market rises beyond thirty percent, it
becomes more likely that a violation will be found.53
A monopoly reseller has the ability to foreclose 100% of the relevant
market by agreeing to deal with one supplier to the exclusion of all
others. Thus, under the exclusive dealing cases, monopoly resellers could
be liable for refusing to purchase from all eligible suppliers. Even
resellers with market shares of less than monopoly proportions will
encounter significant uncertainties in negotiating exclusive arrangements with their suppliers. If a reseller holds more than thirty percent of
the relevant market, it could face a complicated rule of reason inquiry
into the legality of its refusal to deal with certain suppliers. Given the
vagueness of the courts' current rule of reason approach, it will be
difficult for such resellers to predict whether they can safely enter into
exclusive arrangements.
C.

AdministeringBuying Cooperatives

Buying cooperatives give small resellers a means of countering the
market power of their larger competitors. By forming a purchasing joint
venture, small firms can pool their resources to obtain the same leverage
over their suppliers as that enjoyed by larger firms. Small resellers can
also use buying cooperatives to achieve economies of scale similar to
those available to large firms. From an antitrust standpoint, it is
preferable for resellers to form purchasing joint ventures than to augment
their market power through mergers. Competition at the resale level will
be reduced if smaller resellers are forced to merge in order to obtain the
advantages of larger firms. Mergers eliminate all competition among the
parties to the transaction. Purchasing joint ventures, however, allows
smaller resellers to achieve economies of scale while continuing to
compete in the resale of the relevant product. A purchasing joint venture
50. See In re Beltone Elecs. Corp., No. 8928, 1982 FTC LEXIS 32 (FTC July 6, 1982).
51. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
52. See, e.g., Beltone, 1982 FTC LEXIS 32, at *118, *128; Seagood Trading Corp. v. Jerrico, Inc.,
924 F.2d 1555, 1569-70 (11th Cir. 1991).
53. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 46 (1984) (finding foreclosure of
30% of market not unreasonable); United States v. Dairymen, Inc., 660 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1985)
(holding illegal contracts affecting 50% of market).
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only eliminates competition within its narrow scope; outside the confines
of the venture the parties remain free to compete against each other.
Although members of a purchasing joint venture will no longer be
competing on the price they pay to suppliers, they will continue to
compete on the prices they charge consumers. 4
Because purchasing joint ventures are less restrictive of competition
than outright mergers, courts should encourage their formation.
Unfortunately, the courts' current approach discourages such
arrangements by putting firms at risk for implementing certain basic
procedures critical to their success. For example, some courts have held
that it is illegal for a group of purchasers to pool their market power to
negotiate favorable pricing from their suppliers." Joint price negotiations
are essential to the effectiveness of a purchasing cooperative, and
without a clear signal from courts on their legality, resellers may be
reluctant to enter into such ventures. If a purchasing cooperative's price
negotiations are to be successful, it must be able to refuse to buy from
suppliers that fail to meet its requested terms. However, the exclusive
dealing cases earlier discussed put in question the ability of a large
purchasing cooperative to prefer certain suppliers over others.56 Resellers
will likely conclude from such cases that a purchasing joint venture
covering a large percentage of the outlets in a particular market cannot
aggressively pressure its suppliers for more favorable pricing.
Resellers also face significant antitrust risks in administering the
membership rules of purchasing cooperatives. Such groups could not
function without an agreement among their members on the conditions
under which third parties may participate. Buying groups must, for
example, require their members to meet certain minimum financial
standards, because suppliers would not be willing to deal with a group
that constitutes a credit risk. Such eligibility rules, however, may raise
serious antitrust issues. They can be characterized as illegal "group
boycotts," because they amount to a joint agreement by the current
members not to do business with certain competitors.

54. For an explanation of why such characteristics of joint ventures make them preferable to
mergers from an antitrust standpoint, see Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling Competition and
Cooperation:A NewAntitrust StandardforJoint Ventures, 35 William & Mary L. Rev. 871 (1994);
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Beyond Per Se, Rule of Reason or Merger Analysis: A New Antitrust
Standardfor Joint Ventures, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1991).
55. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text
56. See supra PartHLI.B.
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Traditionally, the Supreme Court has deemed group boycotts per se
illegal. Under the per se rule, the courts summarily condemn anticompetitive conduct without giving a defendant the opportunity to prove
its redeeming beneficial purpose or effect. 7 Per se rules have been
adopted in antitrust cases because they conserve judicial resources,
provide clear guidance to businesses and practitioners, and deter
anticompetitive conduct. A per se approach is the preferred method of
analysis for conduct that almost always has anticompetitive effects. In
such cases little is lost by conducting an abbreviated analysis, because
the conduct is highly unlikely to have any beneficial effect. At the same
time, much is gained in terms of more effective antitrust enforcement.5 8
The Court has concluded that a per se approach is appropriate for group
boycotts because in most cases a refusal to deal by a group of
competitors has "proved to be predominantly anti-competitive." 9 By
applying a per se approach to such pernicious conduct, courts can deter
anti-competitive conduct and avoid the litigation costs that a full-fledged
rule of reason inquiry usually entails.6"
One type of group boycott involves refusals to deal by joint ventures
that control "essential facilities." The essential facility cases are similar
to the cases imposing a "duty to deal" upon monopolists. 6 Courts have
recognized that, like a monopolist, an association of competitors may
control a critical resource to which third parties must have access in
order to compete in the relevant market. Members of a joint venture may,
for example, collectively possess monopoly power in the relevant
market; the joint venture may control a "bottleneck," or gateway, through
which firms must pass in order to enter a market; or the venture may
have unique resources, economies of scale, or other competitive
advantages that are impossible for competitors to duplicate. Federal
courts have held that members ofjoint ventures controlling such essential
57. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982); Northern Pac. Ry.
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,5 (1958).
58. The per se rule has been applied to practices clearly having a "pernicious effect on
competition" and lacking "any redeeming virtue." Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5. One
commentator has concluded that conduct is considered per se illegal "because no one has made a
plausible argument that the action is competitive, and its anticompetitive potential seems fairly
obvious." Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Restricted Distribution, and the Market for
ExclusionaryRights, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 1293, 1294-95 n.8 (1987).
59. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289

(1985).
60. Id.
61. For a discussion of cases imposing a duty to deal, see supranote 44 and accompanying text.
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facilities engage in per se illegal group boycotts when they refuse to
admit qualified third parties to the venture.62
A purchasing cooperative that included most of the resellers in the
relevant market could possibly be deemed an essential facility. In such a
case it might be impossible for non-members to form their own
cooperative with a comparable ability to obtain discounts and achieve
economies of scale. The membership restrictions of such a cooperative
could be deemed per se illegal if they denied qualified resellers the
opportunity to participate.
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has begun to apply the rule of
reason to certain types of group boycotts. 63 The movement towards a rule
of reason approach has confused business executives and practitioners
over the applicable standard for analyzing membership rules of
purchasing cooperatives. Indeed, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in
Northwest Wholesale, "there is more confusion about the scope and
operation of the per se rule against group boycotts than in reference to
any other aspect of the per se doctrine."'
The confusion over the dividing line between per se and rule of reason
conduct is critical because most courts have regarded the per se rule and
the rule of reason as opposite approaches to antitrust analysis. Under the
per se rule, a defendant is conclusively presumed to have committed an
antitrust violation when it engages in certain types of conduct. Once the
conduct is proven, the defendant cannot escape liability by arguing that it
had a procompetitive purpose or beneficial effect.65 In contrast, under the
rule of reason, the presumptions are in favor of the defendant. A plaintiff

62. Courts have found it per se illegal for joint ventures to exclude their competitors in a number
of circumstances. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (wire system that
permitted stock brokers to receive trading information from New York Stock Exchange); Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (news gathering services of Associated Press); United
States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) (railroad terminals that constituted only means
of access across Mississippi River to St. Louis); United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d
1351 (5th Cir. 1980) (real estate multiple listing service); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 819
F. Supp. 956 (D. Utah 1993), rev'd, 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994) (credit card network).
63. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (applying rule of reason to dentist
association's refusal to supply patient x-rays to insurance companies); Northwest Wholesale, 472
U.S. at 284 (using rule of reason to analyze membership restrictions of purchasing cooperative).
64. Northwest Wholesale, 472 U.S. at 294 (quoting Lawrence A. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law
ofAntitrust § 83, at 229-30 (1977)).
65. See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (horizontal price
fixing); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (horizontal allocation of
customers and territories).
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must prove a specific adverse effect on competition in a relevant market
in order to prevail. 6 Requiring plaintiffs to prove defendants' market
power has been particularly burdensome.67 In fact, plaintiffs have so
rarely prevailed in rule of reason cases that the approach has been
equated with a rule of per se legality.6"
In Northwest Wholesale, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to
clarify when the per se rule should apply to the membership restrictions
of purchasing cooperatives. The plaintiff in that case alleged that its
expulsion from a buying cooperative of office supply retailers
constituted a per se illegal group boycott.69 The Court pointed out,
however, that the per se rule should not be used to analyze the
membership rules of all purchasing cooperatives because they promote
several potential efficiencies, including "economies of scale in both the
70
purchase and warehousing.., and.., ready access to [inventory]."
The Court concluded that the per se approach should be confined to cases
in which a plaintiff can make a threshold showing that a buying
cooperative "possesses such market power or exclusive access to an
element essential for effective competition."'" Because the plaintiff had
made no such showing with respect to the office supply retailers' buying
group, the Court held that the rule of reason, rather than the per se rule,
should be used to analyze the plaintiff's expulsion from the
cooperative.'

66. As the Ninth Circuit pointed out in American Ad Management, Inc. v. GTE Corp., "[p]roving
injury to competition in a rule of reason case almost uniformly requires a claimant to prove the
relevant market and to show the effects of competition within that market." 92 F.3d 781, 789 (9th
Cir. 1996).
67. Professor Areeda has observed that proof of market power is "difficult, complex, expensive,
and time-consuming." Phillip Areeda, The Changing Contoursof the Per Se Rule, 54 Antitrust L.J.
27, 28 (1985). A Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission has described the "exhaustive and
exhausting document production by the... parties both in and close to the market, endless debates
about elasticity of supply and demand, and all the minutiae that may need to be tied down in a full
rule of reason case." Mary L. Azcuenaga, Market Power as a Screen in Evaluating Horizontal
Restraints, 60 Antitrust L.J. 935, 940 (1992). Indeed, the Commissioner concluded that when a
market power inquiry is required under the rule of reason, most "cases would not be brought simply
because the litigation cost would outweigh the benefits of the case." Id. at 936.
68. See William F. Baxter, The Viability of Vertical RestraintsDoctrine, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 933, 949
(1987).
69. Northwest Wholesale, 472 U.S. at 295.
70. Id. at 288.
71. Id. at298.
72. Id.
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The Supreme Court's decision in Northwest Wholesale failed to
resolve several uncertainties in analyzing membership rules. First, the
Court never explained how the rule of reason should be used on remand
to determine the reasonableness of the cooperative's membership
restrictions. Lower federal courts have no standards by which to balance
the beneficial and adverse effects of access restrictions. It is unclear, for
example, whether courts should balance a buying cooperative's market
power against its potential efficiencies, and if so, what weight should be
afforded to each factor. Second, Northwest Wholesale leaves the dividing
line between per se and rule of reason conduct unclear. The Court did not
define the type of purchasing cooperative that should be deemed an
essential facility, nor did it explain the degree of market power that
would make a cooperative's membership rules per se illegal. Without
additional guidance from courts, resellers will not be able to plan the
membership rules of buying cooperatives efficiently. Because such rules
are so critical to the effectiveness of buying groups, resellers may be
deterred from forming the groups, thereby denying consumers the benefit
of their efficiencies.
D.

Discussingthe Competitive Conduct of Other Resellers

Courts have found it particularly difficult to distinguish between
legitimate and illegal discussions among suppliers and resellers about the
competitive conduct of other dealers. Resellers have legitimate reasons to
complain to their suppliers when other dealers are not doing an effective
job of promoting the suppliers' products. Ineffective resellers can injure
the goodwill and reputation of a supplier's products and adversely affect
all the members of the supplier's distribution system. In certain cases,
however, a reseller may have an anticompetitive purpose in complaining
to a supplier about another dealer. The reseller may be threatened by the
dealer's lower prices or better services and may attempt to use its
leverage as a large purchaser to induce the supplier to take certain actions
against the dealer, such as raising its prices or even terminating its right
to sell products. Courts have found such conduct difficult to analyze,
because it contains both "horizontal" and "vertical" elements.
Courts have generally characterized agreements among direct
competitors as horizontal, and those between a supplier and its customers
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as vertical.73 Group boycott cases such as Northwest Wholesale are
relatively easy to analyze, because they are horizontal in both form and
effect. They involve broad combinations of firms at the same
competitive level allegedly intended to exclude their competitors from
the relevant market. Other types of group boycotts are not as easily
classified because they involve both horizontal and vertical conduct.
"Mixed" group boycotts are vertical in form but horizontal in effect. In
those cases suppliers and resellers have entered into vertical conspiracies
to exclude the resellers' horizontal competitors from the relevant market.
The Supreme Court has traditionally deemed such conduct per se illegal.
In Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., the Court used a per se
approach when a retailer convinced an appliance manufacturer to sell to a
competing retailer only at discriminatorily high prices.74 Similarly, in
United States v. General Motors Corp., a group of Chevrolet dealers
induced General Motors to cease dealing with discounters that competed
with the dealers, and the Court characterized the dealers' conduct as a per
se illegal group boycott.75
Recently, the Supreme Court has grown increasingly concerned that a
per se approach is too harsh on suppliers accused of participating in
mixed group boycotts with resellers. In a series of cases, the Court has
cut back on the scope of the per se rule in such circumstances. The Court
was ostensibly motivated by a desire to recognize more fully the
substantive economic implications of suppliers' conduct. The Court
emphasized in those cases that suppliers have legitimate reasons for
discussing with resellers the competitive conduct of other dealers. Such
discussions, the Court concluded, may give suppliers valuable
information about the efficiency of their distribution system. A supplier
may, for example, learn from one reseller that another dealer is not
providing the types of services necessary to make the supplier's products
attractive to consumers. The Court concluded that a rule of reason, rather
than a per se approach, was necessary to insure that a supplier was not
unfairly penalized for disciplining resellers after such deficiencies had
been brought to its attention by another dealer.76 Ironically, however, the

73. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988); see also United
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); ES Dev., Inc. v. RWM Enters., Inc., 939
F.2d 547, 556 (8th Cir. 1991).
74. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
75. 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
76. See infra notes 87-102 and accompanying text
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Court chose a formalistic basis upon which to distinguish per se from
rule of reason conduct. Instead of attempting to determine whether
suppliers' or resellers' interests were being served by actions taken
against a particular dealer, the Court fell back upon a formalistic
distinction between "price" and "non-price" conduct. The Court's
approach has erected unfair barriers to resellers harmed by mixed group
boycotts and has permitted economically damaging conduct to continue
without an antitrust remedy.
The Court's problems began with a 1977 case, Continental T.V, Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania, involving Sylvania's requirement that distributors sell
its television sets only from authorized locations." Although this
requirement limited competition among the distributors in the resale of
Sylvania televisions (intrabrand competition), the Court recognized that
the restriction also allowed Sylvania to achieve certain efficiencies in
competing against other television manufacturers (interbrand
competition)., 8 The territorial protection afforded by the location clause,
for example, could induce distributors to make the investments necessary
to provide more services to customers, thereby making the Sylvania
brand more attractive to consumers. In implementing such vertical
restrictions, a supplier was likely to be exercising its best judgment on
how to compete most effectively against other brands.7 9 Emphasizing
that such interbrand competition "is the primary concern of antitrust
law," the Court concluded that a rule of per se illegality was not
appropriate for non-price vertical restrictions such as Sylvania's location
clause."0 Departure from the rule of reason standard, the Court pointed
out, "must be based on demonstrable economic effect rather
than ...upon formalistic line drawing."'" The Court held that, in
analyzing non-price vertical restrictions, a court should use the rule of
reason to balance any restriction of intrabrand competition against the
beneficial impact on interbrand competition. 2

77. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
78. Id. at 51-57. The Court explained the differences between interbrand and intrabrand
competition as follows: "Interbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers of the
same generic product.... In contrast, intrabrand competition is the competition between the
distributors-wholesale or retail-of the product of a particular manufacturer." Id. at 52 n.19.
79. Id. at 54-56.
80. Id. at 52 n.19, 56-59.

81. Id. at59.
82. Id. at 54-57.
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The Sylvania Court did not extend this rule of reason approach to
restrictions imposed by suppliers on their dealers' resale prices. In a
footnote, the Court stated that the per se rule should continue to apply to
vertical price-related restraints because they "involve significantly
different questions of analysis and policy."83 However, as Justice White
recognized in his concurring opinion, "the economic arguments in favor
of allowing vertical non-price restraints generally apply to vertical price
restrictions as well."84 Resale price restrictions can be just as effective as
non-price restraints in insuring customer services. Both types of
restrictions can be designed to guarantee distributors a sufficient resale
margin to afford such services.8 Indeed, resale price restraints are a less
stringent means of encouraging customer services. Vertical territorial
restraints preclude all competition between distributors in the resale of
the supplier's products, but resale price restraints allow distributors to
continue to compete in other areas, such as the delivery of customer
services."
The price/non-price dichotomy adopted in Sylvania is particularly
difficult to apply in mixed group boycott cases in which resellers
allegedly induce suppliers to terminate the resellers' competitors. Under
Sylvania, the rule of reason would apply when a supplier terminated a
reseller to enforce a non-price vertical restraint, but the per se rule would
apply if the termination was for a price-related reason. The distinction
between "price" and "non-price" reasons for a termination, however, is
illusory. A supplier may be concerned about a dealer's narrow resale
margins because they prevent the dealer from providing customer
services. Thus, a reseller may complain to a supplier about another
dealer's price cutting, and the supplier may legitimately respond by
83. The Court noted that, unlike nonprice restraints, resale price restrictions might facilitate
cartelizing. Id. at51 n.18.
84. Id. at 69-70 (White, J., concurring).
85. Commentators have pointed out the economic equivalence of price and nonprice vertical
restrictions. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 16, at 289; Wesley J. Liebeler, Resale Price Maintenance
and Consume,: Welfare: Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 36 UCLA L. Rev.
889, 894 (1989).
86. "The territorial restriction affects both price and service competition; the price restriction
affects only price competition." Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of
RestrictedDistribution:PerSe Legality, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 6, 9 (1981). In Eastern Scientific Co. v.
Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, the First Circuit held that a manufacturer could control a dealer's
resale prices on sales outside the dealer's territory because the impact on competition would be less

than if the manufacturer had imposed an airtight territorial restriction forbidding such sales entirely.
572 F.2d 883 (1st Cir. 1978).
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terminating the dealer for a "non-price" reason such as the failure to
provide adequate assistance to consumers.
In mixed group boycott cases subsequent to Sylvania, the Supreme
Court rightfully was concerned about a court's ability to distinguish a
supplier's legitimate "non-price" motives from illegal "price-related"
motives. An obvious solution would have been to overrule the per se
illegality of resale price restrictions and apply an identical rule of reason
analysis to all vertical restraints. The Court, however, was no more
capable of overruling the per se illegality of resale price maintenance in
subsequent cases than in Sylvania.87 With a clear distinction between
price and non-price vertical restraints so firmly established, the Court
faced a difficult dilemma: how to protect Sylvania's recognition of the
potential beneficial effects of non-price vertical restraints when nearly
indistinguishable price-related restraints were per se illegal. The Court's
solution was to restrict the circumstances in which the per se rule could
be invoked in mixed group boycott cases. In its zeal to protect the
Sylvania doctrine, the Court adopted formalistic grounds for
distinguishing between per se and rule of reason conduct. Indeed, the
approach taken by the Court violated its own admonition in Sylvania that
antitrust analysis be based on "demonstrable economic effect."8 8
In Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., the plaintiff was
terminated as a distributor following complaints to the manufacturer
from other distributors about the plaintiff's failure to comply with the
manufacturer's suggested resale prices.89 The plaintiff alleged that the
manufacturer's conduct constituted a per se illegal conspiracy to fix
resale prices. The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that "[a]
manufacturer and its distributors have legitimate reasons to exchange
information about... prices." 9 A manufacturer could be concerned
about its distributors' resale margins for proper "non-price" reasons, such
as the need to ensure that distributors profit enough to pay for various
pre-sale services.9 ' If an inference of conspiracy could be drawn from
ambiguous evidence such as the receipt of price-cutting complaints, the
87. The Court did recently overrule the per se illegality of maximum resale price fixing,
concluding that a rule of reason approach was more appropriate for such restraints. See State Oil Co.
v. Khan & Khan & Assocs., 118 S. Ct. 275 (1997). The Court, however, reaffirmed the per se
illegality of minimum resale price maintenance. Id. at 285.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59.
465 U.S. 752 (1984).
Id. at 762.
Id. at 762-63.
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beneficial exchange of resale pricing information would be deterred.
Thus, even a termination in response to complaints from competing
distributors should not be sufficient to infer the existence of a resale
price fixing conspiracy. In addition, the plaintiff would have to introduce
"evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and
nonterminated distributors were acting independently."" z
The Monsanto Court's concentration on the conspiracy issue has
diverted the lower federal courts' attention from the substantive
economic effect of mixed group boycotts to the formalistic distinction
between unilateral and concerted conduct. As a result, fewer resellers
have been able to survive a motion for summary judgment. It has been
extremely difficult for terminated resellers to meet the Monsanto burden
of proving a negative; that is, that the supplier was not acting
independently of its distributors in effecting a termination. 93 In many
post-Monsanto cases there was substantial evidence that a termination
was effected as a result of competing resellers' complaints; yet, the
courts were willing to accept any plausible justification offered by a
defendant to rebut the inference of conspiracy. 94 Thus, under the federal
courts' interpretation of Monsanto, plaintiffs must disprove the existence
of any or all hypothetical explanations for the manufacturer's conduct
that might justify a dealer termination before a court will even be willing
to consider their substantive allegations.'
Unlike Monsanto, which concerned the procedural issue of
conspiracy, Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. dealt
with the substantive question of the scope of the resale price fixing
offense in mixed group boycott cases.96 In Sharp, the Court once again
adopted a formalistic basis for limiting the rights of terminated resellers.
Because Sharp involved the substantive definition of an antitrust offense,

92. Id. at 763.
93. Id.

94. See, e.g., Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding
termination despite fact that manufacturer received threats that distributors would cease doing
business if manufacturer did not terminate plaintiff); Garment Dist., Inc. v. Belk Stores Servs., Inc.,
799 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1986) (directing verdict against plaintiff despite evidence of acquiesence to
threats from competing retailer); McCabe's Fumiture, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 798 F.2d 323 (9th
Cir. 1986) (holding that evidence of termination of discounter to placate complaining dealer
insufficient to raise inference of resale price fixing conspiracy).
95. House Comm. on the Judiciary, Price Fixing PreventionAct of1991, H.R. Rep. No. 102-237,

at 13 (1991).
96. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
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its holding will likely have an even more adverse effect on plaintiffs than
Monsanto.
The issue in Sharp was whether the per se rule should apply when a
single reseller induced a supplier to terminate a price-cutting competitor.
Business Electronics Corporation, a Houston dealer for Sharp Electronics
Corp., competed with Gilbert Hartwell, the only other Sharp distributor
in Houston. Business Electronics' retail prices were lower than
Hartwell's. Hartwell complained to Sharp on several occasions about
Business Electronics' lower prices. Hartwell finally gave Sharp an
ultimatum: unless Sharp terminated Business Electronics within thirty
days, Hartwell would cease doing business with Sharp. Sharp responded
to Hartwell's threat by terminating Business Electronics within the
thirty-day period.9"
The Supreme Court held that the per se rule was inapplicable because
Sharp and Hartwell had not agreed on the specific prices to be charged
by Hartwell after Business Electronics' termination." As inMonsanto,
the Court feared an overly broad application of the per se rule against
resale price maintenance. The Court pointed out that under a per se
approach a manufacturer's termination of a price-cutter would be unduly
risky. The manufacturer would find it difficult to prove that its real
motivation for the termination was to insure adequate customer services
rather than protect a dealer's profit margin. 99 Reaffirming Sylvania's
determination that "interbrand competition is the primary concern of the
antitrust laws,"'0 0 the Court concluded that a rule of per se illegality was
not necessary to protect intrabrand competition.'0 ' Thus, a termination
induced by a single dealer should only be per se illegal when the dealer
and manufacturer have entered into an express agreement to fix specific
resale prices after the termination. In all other cases, induced
terminations should be judged under the rule of reason. 0 2
Sharp's requirement for the setting of a specific resale price merely
introduces another formalistic rule into the analysis of mixed group
97. Id.at 721.
98, Id.at 726-27.
99. Id. at 727-28 ("In the vast majority of cases, it will be extremely difficult for the
manufacturer to convince a jury that its motivation was to ensure adequate services, since price
cutting and some measure of service cutting usually go hand in hand.").
100. Id.at 726.
101. Id.at 725.
102. Id. at 726-27.
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boycotts. Like the price/non-price and unilateral/conspiracy dichotomies,
the "specific price" standard bears no relationship to substantive
economic effect. Indeed, the termination of a price-cutter at the behest of
a competing reseller can have an even greater adverse effect on
consumers than a manufacturer's requirement that a distributor charge a
specific resale price. If Sharp had imposed resale prices and left Business
Electronics and Hartwell free to compete in Houston in the non-price
arena, consumers at least could have chosen the dealer that provided the
best services. As it was, however, Business Electronics was completely
excluded from the relevant market. Consumers were left with only one
outlet for Sharp calculators, which could set prices and provide services
as it saw fit without fear of retail competition.
In Sharp, the Supreme Court was most deficient in disregarding the
precedent of its own mixed group boycott cases. Hartwell's ultimatum to
Sharp possessed the classic characteristics of a mixed group boycott: a
reseller's exercise of pressure to induce a supplier not to deal with the
boycott victim. In the mixed group boycott cases, the Court did not deny
application of a per se approach to the defendants' conduct simply
because it was imposed from above." 3 However, in Sharp the Court
distinguished cases such as General Motors and Klor's on the ground
that they involved "horizontal combinations" at some competitive level,
while only Sharp and Hartwell were involved in the termination of
Business Electronics." Thus, under Sharp, the per se rule would
presumably apply when two or more resellers induce a supplier to
terminate a fellow reseller;0 5 but, a court would have to use the rule of
reason when only one reseller caused a supplier to take the same action.
In making this formalistic distinction, the Court showed less economic
discernment than the lower federal courts, which have recognized the
horizontal competitive substance of terminations induced by a single
distributor.0 6 Indeed, the Sharp Court completely misinterpreted Klor's,
103. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
104. Sharp, 485 U.S. at 734.
105. See Lovett v. General Motors Corp., 769 F. Supp. 1506 (D. Minn. 1991), rev'd on other
grounds, 998 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1993) (interpreting Sharp to require per se approach when several
dealers induce manufacturer to terminate competing dealer).
106. See Zidell Explorations, Inc. v. Conval Int'l, 719 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that
valve distributor induced foreign manufacturer to terminate competitor); Alloy Int'l Co. v. HooverNSK Bearing Co., 635 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding that bearing distributor was terminated at
request of competitor); Cemuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying
per se rule when retailer of kitchen cabinets convinced cabinet manufacturer to terminate competing
retailer); see also A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star Mach. Co., 653 F.2d 1302, 1305 n.3 (9th Cir. 19S1) ("[A]
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where, as in Sharp, only one retailer induced a supplier to take an
adverse action against a competing retailer." 7
The cumulative effect of Monsanto and Sharp will be to deny most
terminated resellers the opportunity to have a fact-finder even consider a
supplier's liability under a per se instruction. Prior to Sharp, lower
federal courts had already interpreted the Monsanto requirement for
proof of evidence beyond a supplier's receipt of dealer complaints as a
mandate to dismiss most terminated resellers' cases on summary
judgment.' Those few plaintiffs who could have survived summary
judgment under Monsanto will now find that they will have to prove not
merely a conspiracy to terminate a price-cutter, but an express resale
price maintenance agreement between the supplier and the remaining
dealer. Only
a few, if any, terminated resellers will be able to meet such a
10 9
hurdle.
Without the benefit of a per se approach, most plaintiffs will have
little chance of prevailing in mixed group boycott cases. Plaintiffs will
find it particularly difficult to prove a defendant's undue market power
in the interbrand market." 0 Under the Sylvania rule of reason standard, a
terminated distributor will have to prove that the adverse effect of its
termination on intrabrand competition outweighs the termination's
beneficial effect on interbrand competition."' It is impossible for the
federal courts to conduct such a balancing test. There are no standards by
which the courts can quantify the specific effects of a dealer's
termination upon intrabrand and interbrand competition. A termination
per se violation might be established if a manufacuturer's decision to terminate a dealer was
prompted by dealer coercion, either by a single dealer or by a group of dealers.").
107. See supranote 74 and accompanying text
108. See supranotes 93-95 and accompanying text
109. Indeed, following Monsanto and Sharp, the lower federal courts have dismissed cases
brought by price-cutting distributors despite substantial evidence that their suppliers were induced to
effect the termination by complaints from larger dealers selling at higher prices. See, e.g., Jeanery,
Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc.. 849 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1988) (granting judgment notwithstanding
verdict to clothing manufacturer that terminated price-cutting dealer following complaints about
dealer's low prices from one of manufacturer's "best customers").
110. Several U.S. Senators have pointed out that if plaintiffs are required to prove market power
as a condition to reaching a jury in a mixed group boycott case, they "may simply forego a lawsuit."
S. Rep. No. 102-42. at 17 (1991) (presenting views in support of S.409 by Senators Metzenbaum,
Biden, Kennedy, Leahy, Simon and Roth). In Denny's Marina, Inc. v. Renfro Prods., Inc., the court
stated that under the rule of reason a plaintiff "simply cannot afford the elaborate market analysis
and expert witnesses required to make... a showing [of adverse market effects]." 8 F.3d 1217, 1221
(7th Cir. 1993).
111. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36,57 n.27 (1977).
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reduces intrabrand competition by removing a firm as a reseller of a
supplier's product, but the courts have no means of confirming the
precise extent to which such competition is reduced. The courts also
cannot determine the degree to which a termination may promote
interbrand competition. For example, it is impossible to determine the
extent to which the removal of an ineffective reseller encourages the
remaining dealers to promote more aggressively a supplier's competing
products. Even if such a beneficial interbrand effect could be
demonstrated, courts would have to decide whether it should be
discounted to the extent that the supplier already possesses a substantial
share of the interbrand market.
Finally, even if courts could quantify the specific competitive effects
of a termination, they would have no way of balancing its adverse
intrabrand effects against its beneficial interbrand effects. Intrabrand and
interbrand competition cannot be measured against each other because
they have completely different characteristics. Interbrand competition
encompasses the entire phase of the production process, from research
and development through the final sale of a product. It includes all firms
capable of producing a particular type of product. Intrabrand
competition, on the other hand, is much narrower in scope. It is limited to
the resale phase of a single manufacturer's product. Intrabrand
competition is, in fact, entirely the creation of a single manufacturer. If it
wishes, a manufacturer can, without violating the antitrust laws,
eliminate all intrabrand competition simply by electing to sell products
directly to consumers instead of through dealers.
E.

The Needfor a New Approach

The legality of a broad range of resellers' conduct remains difficult to
predict under the courts' current approach. In light of the increasing
market power of resellers in the American economy, this judicial
uncertainty could significantly harm consumer welfare." 2 The current
antitrust standards are likely to have the unfortunate effect of
encouraging resellers both to avoid efficiency-enhancing behavior and to
engage in anticompetitive conduct. For example, superstores may
interpret the monopsony and exclusive dealing cases as a rationale for
deferring aggressive price negotiations that could benefit consumers. At
112. For a discussion of resellers' market power, see supra notes 7-10, 33-36 and accompanying
text
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the same time, Monsanto and Sharp have convinced certain superstores
that they can use their market power to induce suppliers to discriminate
against firms that threaten their market position." 3 The increased latitude
given to resellers in such circumstances could harm consumers by
depriving them of lower-cost or better-quality alternatives for certain
brands.
Courts need to develop an antitrust theory for the analysis of resellers'
conduct that provides better guidance to businesses and their counsel,
encourages resellers to engage in efficiency-enhancing conduct, and
deters them from taking actions that harm consumers. This Article
proposes a new approach that accomplishes such objectives and that can
be implemented by courts and enforcement agencies in a manner
consistent with antitrust tradition and precedent.
IV. A PROPOSED APPROACH FOR ANALYZING
RESELLERS' CONDUCT
A.

Looking Beyond the Per Se/Rule ofReason Dichotomy

In analyzing resellers' competitive conduct, courts need not be bound
by the traditional per se/rule of reason dichotomy. It is not necessary for
courts to choose between the extremes of a harsh per se and a permissive
rule of reason approach. They can adopt an intermediate standard that
considers the substantive economic effects of the relevant conduct
without unduly prejudicing plaintiffs. The per se rule and rule of reason
are better viewed as points along a continuum than as opposing standards
of antitrust analysis." 4 In many instances there is no "bright line"
distinction between per se and rule of reason conduct. Indeed, per se
113. For example, in 1990 Toys "R" Us sued R-H. Macy for inducing manufacturers not to sell
children's swimwear to it. Toys "R" Us alleged that Macy's was attempting to prevent low-price
competition from Toys "R" Us. See Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. RH. Macy & Co., 728 F. Supp. 230
(S.D.N.Y. 1990). However, relying on Monsanto and Sharp, the court granted summary judgment
for Macy's. Id. Following the decision, Toys "R" Us concluded that, under Monsanto and Sharp, it,
like Macy's, could safely pressure its own suppliers not to do business with competing warehouse
clubs. Ironically, however, an Administrative Law Judge of the FTC recently concluded that Toys
"R"Us had more market power than Macy's and it therefore violated section 1 by bringing such
pressure to bear on its suppliers. See In re Toys 'R" Us, No. 9273, 1997 FTC LEXIS 284 (FTC Sept.
25, 1997). Toys "R" Us has decided to continue to refuse to carry toys sold to warehouse clubs while
it appeals the decision. See William M. Bulkeley, Toys R" Us Dreams of a Greener Christmas this
Year, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1997, at B4.
114. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule ofReason Approaches to Antitrust
Analysis, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 685 (1991).
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rules are no more than an abbreviated version of the rule of reason. Per
se rules, like the rule of reason, are based on courts' conclusions about
the economic purpose and effect of particular competitive restraints. The

per se rule simply represents an assumption, based on a long history of
judicial experience, that the anticompetitive effects of a particular
restraint will almost always outweigh its potential efficiencies." 5 The per
se rule and rule of reason differ only in the amount of analysis required
to reach a conclusion on the net competitive impact of a restraint. The
per se rule does not absolve courts of the necessity to inquire into the
nature of the restraint at issue. Before the per se rule can be applied, a
court must determine whether the specific conduct at issue belongs
within a per se category. In some cases this determination even involves
a market power analysis." 6 At the same time, the rule of reason does not
always require an elaborate market inquiry. The rule "can sometimes be
applied in the twinkling of an eye.""' 7 Thus, when the per se rule is
inapplicable, the alternative need not be a full-blown analysis of the
market impact of the restraint at issue."'
115. In FTC v. SuperiorCourt TrialLawyers Ass"n, the Court acknowledged that the per se rule is
based on the ultimate economic effect of section I conduct: "The per se rules also reflect a
longstanding judgment that the prohibited practices by their nature have a substantial potential for
impact on competition." 493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990) (quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984)); see also Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery &
Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985) (stating that "[t]he per se approach permits categorical
judgments with respect to certain business practices that have proved to be predominantly
anticompetitive"); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (noting
"[o]nce experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence
that the rule of reason will condemn it. it has applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint is
unreasonable").
116. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13-14 (holding that before invoking per se rule for tying
arrangement, plaintiff must show that defendant possessed significant share of tying product
market).
117. Areeda, supra note 67, at 30 ("In Realty Multi-List, [629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980)], the Fifth
Circuit rejected the government's claim of per se illegality, but then applied the rule of reason as the
appellants watched-before their very eyes.").
118. The antitrust enforcement agencies have recently begun to recognize the need for an
intermediate standard between the extremes of the per se rule and the rule of reason. On one hand,
the agencies have set forth circumstances in which the efficiencies of traditional per se conduct
should be recognized. In In re CaliforniaDentalAss'n,for example, the FTC invoked the per se rule
to condemn restrictions on price advertising imposed by the members of a dental association, but
stated that it would be "open to [procompetitive] arguments... that might save [the restrictions]
from per se condemnation." No. 9259, 1996 FTC LEXIS 88, at *30 n.13 (FTC Mar. 25, 1996). On
the other hand, the agencies have also pointed out that a fill market power analysis should not be
required for conduct that is clearly anti-competitive. The Assistant Attorney General for example,
has set forth a "quick look" analysis for horizontal restraints that limit price or output. See Joel I.
Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Div., A Stepwise Approach to Antitrust Review
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Neither a traditional per se nor a rule of reason approach is appropriate
for the analysis of resellers' conduct. A per se approach fails to account
for the potential efficiencies of resellers' actions, while the rule of reason
gives resellers too wide a latitude to restrict competition. Instead of the
per se rule or rule of reason, the courts should adopt the "ancillary
restraints doctrine," which takes into account substantive economics
under a formulation that is easy for courts to apply and businesses to
understand.
B.

Formulatingan Ancillary RestraintsApproach

The basis for an ancillary restraints approach to Sherman Act conduct
was first set forth by Judge Taft exactly 100 years ago. In the 1898 case
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., Judge Taft viewed the
purpose of a defendant's conduct as the touchstone for its legality." 9
Restraints among competitors, Judge Taft concluded, could be justified
only to the extent they were ancillary to the legitimate purposes of a
separate contract between the parties. Thus:
[T]he contract must be one in which there is a main purpose, to
which the covenant in restraint of trade is merely ancillary.... The
main purpose of the contract suggests the measure of protection
needed, and furnishes a sufficiently uniform standard by which the
validity of such restraints may be judicially determined. In such a
case, if the restraint exceeds the necessity presented by the main
purpose of the contract, it is void.... "0
Under Judge Taft's approach, restraints would be upheld as ancillary if
they are not broader than necessary to promote the efficiency-enhancing
objectives of the parties' contractual relationship; they would be void as
"naked" restraints if they were unrelated to such objectives or broader
than required to accomplish those objectives.
In recent years, lower federal courts have begun to use Judge Taft's
ancillary restraints approach to analyze various restraints implemented
of HorizontalAgreements, Remarks at ABA Antitrust Section's Semi-Annual Fall Policy Program
(Nov. 7, 1996), availablein 1996 WL 655653. The Department of Justice will require the defendant
to establish a procompetitive justification for such restraints. If the defendant cannot do so, the
agency will not have "to prove actual anticompetitive effects or define markets and show market
power." Id. at *5.
119. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
120. Id. at282.
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among competitors. In those cases, courts upheld restrictions necessary
to insure the effectiveness of ventures in which competitors integrated
their operations to achieve some efficiency objective.' Although not yet
explicitly adopted by the Supreme Court, the ancillary restraints doctrine
is consistent with several of the Court's recent decisions. The Court has
allowed competitors to implement restrictions on price or output that
were incidental to efficiency-enhancing arrangements and has precluded
restraints that were broader than necessary to promote the efficiency
objectives of such arrangements.'
Each type of resellers' conduct previously described" can be
analyzed more effectively under the ancillary restraints doctrine than
under the approaches courts have followed to date. In an economic sense,
a reseller and its suppliers are engaged in a partnership to deliver
products to consumers in the most efficient manner possible. The terms
of the partnership are set forth in the conditions of sale negotiated by a
reseller with its suppliers. Consumers benefit when a reseller is able to
convince a supplier to lower its price, accelerate delivery, improve
quality, or otherwise enhance the efficiency of the distribution
relationship. Courts should uphold any restrictions among resellers and
their suppliers that are required to promote such efficiencies. Consumers,
however, are harmed when competitive restraints exceed the legitimate
objectives of the distribution partnership between a supplier and its
resellers. Reseller should not be allowed to use their market power to
121. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210,229 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(upholding horizontal restraints among agents of van line designed to avoid free riding); National
Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 601-02 (11 th Cir. 1986) (denying application of
per se rule to interchange fee among members of VISA credit card system because fee was
"necessary" term without which system would not function); Polk Bros. Inc. v. Forest City Enters.,
Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying rule of reason to noncompetition covenant between
competing retailers designed to eliminate free riding).
122. In those cases, the Court permitted horizontal restraints necessary for the effectiveness of an
integrated cooperative arrangement but precluded restraints that were broader than required for such
purpose. In BroadcastingMusic. Inc. v. Columbia BroadcastingSys., Inc., the Court upheld a price
fixing arrangement that was ancillary to musical composers' efforts to market their compositions
jointly. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). Similarly, the membership restrictions approved in Northwest Wholesale
were necessary for the effective functioning of the purchasing cooperative. Northwest Wholesale
Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 296 (1985). Indeed, Judge Bork
has concluded that Northwest Wholesale's "statement of the lav of ancillary restraints is so close to
that of Addyston Pipe & Steel as to be virtually indistinguishable." Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d at 229.
In NCAA v. Board of Regents, the Court precluded certain restrictions on the televising of games by
the member colleges of the NCAA, because such restrictions were not required to promote the
NCAA's legitimate interest in amateur collegiate athletics. 468 U.S. 85, 117-20 (1984).
123. See supraPart IlL
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limit competition for purposes unrelated to distributional efficiencies.
Under an ancillary restraints approach, such conduct would be precluded
as a naked restraint of trade.
An ancillary restraints approach appropriately concentrates on the
conduct of resellers rather than on market power concentration levels.
Economists have pointed out that the consequences of firms' competitive
conduct are more significant than the effects of market structure. 24
During the last two decades, federal courts have concluded that the
Sherman Act should not be construed to protect small businesses against
the acquisition of market power by their larger competitors. Courts have
made it clear that the antitrust laws are designed to enhance consumer
welfare rather than to protect individual competitors, and that
competitors should only prevail in antitrust cases when they can
demonstrate that a defendant has engaged in conduct harmful to
consumers."z It therefore should not be illegal for resellers to obtain
market power, whether by internal growth, through acquisitions, or by
participating in joint ventures with their competitors.' 26 Market power
should only be illegal when firms exercise it in a way that harms
consumers by raising prices or restricting output. 27 Thus, smaller
retailers should not have an antitrust claim simply because they are
unable to compete with the superstores on price. Volume-related
efficiencies achieved by the superstores benefit consumers, and if
smaller retailers are hurt in the process, that is simply a consequence of
the legitimate workings of the marketplace. Furthermore, smaller
retailers have several means of countering the market power of their
larger competitors. They can enhance their own market power by
acquiring or merging with other firms, or if they wish to retain their

124. One economist recently pointed out:
There is ... less sound theoretical support for the proposition that a... particular merger makes
that coordination more likely or... significant in its impact on the marketplace.... It could be
that... an important part of competitive effects of concern is the way in which a merger might
influence the character of conduct.
Interview with EconomistRobert D. Willig, Antitrust, Spring 1997, at 11, 11, 15.
125. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,343 (1979); Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d at 745.
126. Resellers' mergers or acquisitions which "substantially lessen competition" may, however,
be illegal under section 7 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994); see, e.g., FTC v. Staples, Inc.,
970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997) (granting motion for preliminary injunction against acquisition by
Staples, Inc. of Office Depot, Inc., on grounds that there was substantial likelihood acquisition
would substantially lessen competition in office supply superstore market).
127. See, e.g, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).
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independence, they can form buying groups capable of achieving
efficiencies comparable to those achieved by their larger competitors.
In Sherman Act cases, courts should be concerned not with whether
resellers have obtained market power, but whether they have abused their
power in any way. An ancillary restraints approach is an effective means
of determining when resellers have misused their market power in
negotiating terms of sale, selecting suppliers, and responding to the
competitive conduct of other resellers. Under this approach, it would be
permissible for any reseller, regardless of its market power, to negotiate
the most favorable possible prices and other terms of sale with its
suppliers. Such negotiations are ancillary to a reseller's legitimate
objective of delivering products to consumers more efficiently and thus
should never be deemed to constitute an abuse of a reseller's market
power. In certain cases, however, a supplier or competitor should be able
to challenge a reseller's refusal to deal. The reseller's refusal can
adversely affect competition when a reseller controls an essential facility
to which firms must have access in order to compete in the relevant
market. Such a reseller misuses its market power when it denies access to
an essential facility for reasons unrelated to the efficiency of its
distribution system. Finally, under an ancillary restraints analysis,
resellers would be permitted to bring to their suppliers' attention the
deficiencies in other resellers' promotion of the suppliers' products, but
they would be precluded from inducing suppliers to take adverse actions
against resellers for reasons unrelated to such concerns.
Such an analysis would preserve the advantages of the traditional per
se and rule of reason approaches while avoiding their deficiencies. As
under the rule of reason, defendants would be protected from spurious
lawsuits. Plaintiffs would be reluctant to bring cases unless they had
clear evidence that a reseller and supplier had engaged in naked conduct
unrelated to the legitimate objectives of their distribution partnership. At
the same time, an ancillary restraints analysis, like the per se rule, would
conserve judicial resources, give clear guidance on the legality of
particular conduct, and deter anti-competitive behavior. After only a
minimal inquiry, courts and enforcement agencies could determine
whether certain actions by resellers should be upheld as ancillary to their
distribution systems or precluded as naked restraints. As a consequence,
resellers, suppliers, and their competitors would have a better
understanding of the boundaries of proper competitive behavior.
Resellers would be less likely to engage in anti-competitive conduct
because they would be aware that plaintiffs with legitimate claims would
have a better chance of withstanding summary judgment motions.
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V.

APPLYING THE PROPOSED APPROACH TO SPECIFIC
RESELLER CONDUCT

A.

NegotiatingPriceand Other Terms of Sale

It should not be per se legal for a reseller to attempt to negotiate the
most favorable possible prices and other terms of sale with its suppliers,
regardless of the reseller's market power. Such conduct is ancillary to the
distribution partnership between a reseller and its suppliers. By
aggressively negotiating lower prices and other terms, large resellers
obtain more latitude to reduce their own prices to customers. The
reseller's conduct may "harm" suppliers and other competing resellers,
but because its predominant effect is beneficial to consumers, it should
not be illegal under the antitrust laws." 8
Because of their ability to buy large amounts of product, large
resellers such as superstores are likely to be more successful than smaller
resellers in obtaining favorable terms from suppliers. This gives the
superstores a competitive advantage over other retailers, 9 but such an
advantage is a natural and legitimate consequence of the superstores'
market power. The injury suffered by the superstores' smaller
competitors does not flow from any abuse of such market power, and it
therefore should not be cognizable under the Sherman Act. 3 Indeed, if
they want to counter a superstore's advantages in negotiating favorable
prices, smaller retailers can pool their market power in purchasing
cooperatives that have comparable leverage against suppliers.
The "harm" suffered by suppliers as a result of superstores' aggressive
price negotiations is also not of the type protected by the antitrust laws.
The supplier may experience a lower profit margin, but competition in
the relevant market will not be limited in any manner.' Indeed, the only
128. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text
129. For example, because of their buying power, pet superstores can afford to sell for $18.50 a
20 lb. bag of dog food that costs independent retailers $22.50. Fuetsch, supra note 10, at HI.
130. It should, however, be illegal for a reseller to require a supplier not only to sell to it at a low
price but also to sell to its competitors at a higher price. Such an agreement has a clear adverse effect
on the reseller's competitors and is not ancillary to the legitimate objectives of the reseller's
partnership with its suppliers. Such naked restraints of trade should be precluded on their face. See
infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
131. In Medical Arts Pharmacy v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, the court rejected a pharmacy's
argument that a local Blue Cross organization violated section 1 by unreasonably reducing the
pharmacy's profit margins. 518 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Conn. 1981). Blue Cross had set limits on the
amount it would reimburse pharmacies for certain prescription drugs. The court concluded that this
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effect on competition will be beneficial, as resellers pass on lower prices
to consumers. Courts should not interfere with the mutual determination
by a supplier and a superstore of how to share the benefits and burdens of
their distribution relationship. When a superstore has greater market
power, a supplier will be forced to bear a greater share of that burden. A
supplier, however, has several means of responding to a superstore's
market power. The supplier can augment its own leverage through
acquisitions or internal growth; it can pressure the superstore by
threatening not to deal with it at too low a price, or it can protect its
profit margins by enhancing its upstream efficiency. Furthermore,
superstores, left to their own devices, are not likely to push suppliers to a
point beyond which they can operate effectively. Most superstores
realize that their long-term interests are best served by reliable suppliers
who can continue to supply them with high quality products.
Some commentators have concluded that monopoly purchasers should
not be allowed to use their market power to negotiate below-market
prices from their suppliers.' A few courts, however, have adopted the
better view that resellers, regardless of their market power, should be
given free rein to obtain the most favorable possible prices. In
Westchester Radiological Associates v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, Inc., a group of radiologists alleged that an insurance company
had unlawfully used its market power to lower the prices its subscribers
paid for radiology services.' The court accepted the contention that the
insurance company had significant market power. However, it concluded
that the company did not violate the antitrust laws when it used that
market power to lower prices. "The law does not prevent a [reseller] with
market power from negotiating a good price.... 'Even if the [reseller]
has monopoly power, an antitrust court ...will not interfere with a
[reseller's] determination of price. ...A legitimate [reseller] is entitled
to use its market power to keep prices down."" 3 4
It should be no less permissible for a reseller to negotiate a common
low price with a group of suppliers than for it to agree on such a price
practice was not illegal under the rule of reason because it did not cause any adverse effect on
competition. Id. at 1107-09.
132. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
133. 707 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
134. Id. at 715; see also United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting
Government's claim that owner of all "first run" movie theaters in Las Vegas illegally used its
that defendant bought
monopsony power to decrease price it paid to exhibit such movies, despite fact
out all other first run theaters in area).
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with a single supplier. An agreement with several suppliers has just as
beneficial an effect and has no greater adverse effect on competition. It
could be argued that a reseller's establishment of a uniform purchasing
price with a group of competing suppliers constitutes a type of price
fixing. However, the price fixing condemned by the Sherman Act is not
that which exists between the contracting parties themselves.' Most
contracts for the purchase and sale of goods or services fix the price that
will be charged by the supplying firm. Such terms should be permitted as
ancillary to the legitimate purposes of such contracts. Price fixing
agreements are only illegal when the parties establish the prices upon
which they will deal with third parties. A reseller's negotiation of
favorable prices with a group of suppliers should have no effect on the
prices charged to the reseller's competitors. Thus, the
arrangement
136
should not be deemed illegal as a price fixing agreement.
If individual resellers are allowed to negotiate uniform low prices with
a group of suppliers regardless of their market power, a group of several
resellers should also be allowed to do so through a purchasing
cooperative. A lower price is no less favorable to consumers when it is
made available to several rather than to only one reseller. Indeed,
consumers benefit even more when the lower price is widely available.
The negotiation of favorable terms of sale by a buying group should be
deemed ancillary to the group's legitimate purpose of enhancing its
members' resale efficiency. Because lower prices benefit consumers,
negotiations should be permitted regardless of the collective market
power of the group members. Furthermore, just as in the case of
negotiations by individual resellers, the joint negotiation of a favorable
price by a group of resellers need not affect the prices charged to third
parties. The resellers should not be deemed to have engaged in price

135. In Medical Arts Pharmacy, for example, Blue Cross had set limits on the amounts it would
reimburse pharmacies for certain prescription drugs. 518 F. Supp. at 1100. One of the pharmacies
alleged that the arrangement constituted a per se illegal horizontal price fixing agreement. Id. The
court concluded, however, that the arrangement was not illegal because it did not affect the prices
the pharmacies charged to third parties:
The only price that is established by the pharmacy agreement is the price that Blue Cross will
pay participating pharmacies for prescribed drugs. "The price fixing within the scope of the per
se prohibition of section 1, however, is an agreement to fix the price to be charged in
transactions with third parties, not between the contracting parties themselves."
Id. at 1107 (citation omitted).
136. Id. at 1106.
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fixing as long as they refrain from specifying the terms upon which
suppliers must deal with their competitors.
There are, however, circumstances in which the negotiation of a

favorable price by a group of resellers may not be deemed ancillary to
the resellers' legitimate efficiency objectives. Competing resellers should
only be permitted to negotiate uniform prices with a group of suppliers
when the resellers have integrated their operations in a legitimate buying
cooperative. In such cases courts can be confident that the impetus for
the uniform prices comes from the resellers and that they are acting to
enhance their efficiency. However, if the resellers have not formed a
joint buying group, no contractual integration would exist to which the
price negotiations would be ancillary.' 37 In the absence of a buying
cooperative, a uniform selling price to a group of resellers is more likely
to constitute an attempt by suppliers to stabilize overall prices 13in
the
8
market than an attempt by the resellers to enhance their efficiency.
B.

Resellers'Direct Refusals to Deal

1.

Refusals to Deal with Suppliers

In 1919, in United States v. Colgate Co., the Supreme Court held that
"[i]n the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the
[Sherman] Act does not restrict the long-recognized right of a
trader.., freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties
with whom he will deal."' 139 There are good reasons for courts to give

137. The Department of Justice has recognized that a true joint venture must "involve some
economic integration of the venture members' operations beyond the mere coordination of their
pricing and output decisions." See Antitrust Enforcement Guidelinesfor InternationalOperations1988, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCI-)
13,107 (Apr. 11, 1995). Thus, in the absence of such integration,
price-fixing arrangements should be precluded as naked restraints of trade. In their guidelines on
health care joint ventures, the FTC and Department of Justice explained that agreements among
physicians to fix the price of their services would be treated as per se illegal cartels rather than as
legitimate joint ventures when the physicians do not integrate their resources or share financial risks
for the purpose of delivering health care services more efficiently. See Department ofJustice and
FederalTrade Commission Statements ofAntitrust Enforcement Policyin Health Care,4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 13,153, at 20,817, 20,821-22 (Sept. 5, 1996).
138. Thus, in Mandeville IslandFarms,Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., it was appropriate for
the Supreme Court to preclude a group of sugar refiners from agreeing to pay a uniform price to a
group of sugar beet growers, because the refiners had not integrated their purchasing operations in
any manner. 334 U.S. 219 (1948). The uniform price amounted to a naked restraint of trade with no
efficiency-enhancing purpose. Id. at 235-36.
139. 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
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most resellers wide latitude to select their suppliers without running afoul
of the antitrust laws. Resellers are likely to have legitimate reasons for
choosing one supplier over another. A reseller's decision may be based
not only on price, delivery or other terms of sale, but on more subjective
concerns such as the quality of a supplier's product, the prospect of a
long-term association, or relationships with the supplier's personnel. In
order to deliver products to consumers most efficiently, resellers should
have the maximum possible ability to choose those suppliers that they
believe are best suited to meet their unique requirements. A court may do
more harm than good by attempting to second-guess such a decision by a
reseller.
Under an ancillary restraints analysis, resellers would be free to deal
with any suppliers they wished, as long as the resellers did not control a
resource essential for effective competition in the relevant market.
Resellers often have legitimate efficiency-enhancing reasons for refusing
to deal with suppliers. If a reseller does not control a product, facility, or
other resource to which a supplier must have access in order to compete
in the relevant market, the reseller's refusal to deal cannot competitively
harm the supplier. In such a case the supplier will be able to access other
outlets competitive to those that the reseller controls. The only possible
effect of a reseller's refusal to deal under such circumstances would be
beneficial, and courts should not risk an unfair result by reviewing the
reseller's decision.
Courts should therefore require a supplier to prove the existence of an
essential facility before allowing it to challenge a reseller's refusal to
deal. A reseller should not be deemed essential unless it controls at least
fifty percent of the potential intrabrand demand for a supplier's
products. 40 When a reseller accounts for less than half of such demand,
suppliers will have sufficient alternatives to dealing with the reseller.
140. In determining whether a reseller meets the 50% test, the courts must of course consider the
relevant geographic market. In many cases the relevant geographic market may include only a
particular section of the country, and a reseller that controls more than 50% of the supplier's sales in
that territory may be deemed to meet the essentiality test. Under the 1992 Merger Guidelines of the
federal antitrust enforcement agencies, the relevant geographic market includes only those locations
from which purchasers would seek alternative suppliers in response to a five percent price increase.
See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger
Guidelines-1992,4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104, at 20,573-6 (Apr. 7, 1992). In certain cases,
transportation costs, the location of the supplier's plant, and unique buying and shipping patterns
may limit the relevant geographic market to a relatively small area. Thus, a reseller that controls
more than 50% of the sales of a supplier's product in a particular metropolitan area may qualify as an
essential reseller.
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Thus, if the plaintiff does not meet its burden of proving a reseller's fifty
percent market share, courts should uphold the reseller's refusal to deal
without any further inquiry. However, if the plaintiff meets the threshold
test, a court would be justified in concluding that a reseller could
competitively harm a supplier by refusing to do business with it. In such
a case the reseller should be deemed to control an essential gateway to
the market. With more than half of the market foreclosed, a supplier
would not be able to bid on sufficient remaining business to be a viable
competitor. Such essential resellers should have the burden of
demonstrating a legitimate business justification for their refusals to deal.
In contrast to the complexity of the rule of reason, 4' an ancillary
restraints approach to such refusals to deal would be straightforward. The
reseller's conduct would be upheld as an ancillary restraint if it were
necessary to promote the legitimate objectives of the reseller's
distribution partnership with its suppliers. The conduct would be deemed
illegal as a naked restraint if it were unrelated to such objectives or
broader than necessary to achieve the objectives.
Once a supplier has proven that a reseller meets the fifty percent
threshold test, it should be relatively easy for courts to judge the
legitimacy of the reseller's justifications for its refusal to deal. It should
be permissible, even for a firm controlling more than fifty percent of a
resale market, to refuse to purchase from a supplier that fails to meet the
reseller's demands for lower prices, improved quality, or other favorable
terms of sale. Resellers should be allowed to negotiate aggressively such
terms, regardless of their market power. 42 In connection with those
negotiations, resellers should also be free to refuse to deal with suppliers
that fail to agree to their terms.'43 However, a large reseller should not be
allowed to refuse to purchase from a supplier that is willing to meet its

141. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text
142. See supra Part V.A.
143. See M&H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973 (Ist Cir. 1984) (allowing
association of race car tracks and drivers to select single supplier to reduce costs of purchasing tires);
Cartrade, Inc. v. Ford Dealers Adver. Ass'n, 446 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1971) (finding no violation of
section 1 when association of 143 Ford dealers in Southern California decided to switch from one
supplier of "car trading" services to another); Parmalee Transp. Co. v. Keeslin, 292 F.2d 794 (7th
Cir. 1961) (upholding right of association of 21 railroads in Chicago area to select new supplier of
transfer services that offered lower prices to members of association); Langston Corp. v. Standard
Register Co., 553 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (permitting group buying association composed of
several hospitals to switch its provider of business forms to obtain more favorable sales terms).
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requested terms of sale.'" Such an arbitrary refusal to deal would be
unrelated to the reseller's legitimate distribution objectives and should be
precluded as a naked competitive restraint.'4 5 Indeed, a reseller's refusal
to deal under such circumstances could substantially harm consumers. A
supplier could be completely excluded from the market, thereby
depriving consumers of alternative products and potentially lower resale
prices.

Either an individual reseller or an association of resellers may be large

enough to be deemed an essential facility.'46 An HMO, for example, may
cover more than fifty percent of the patients in a particular area.'47 In
such a case, physicians could not practice effectively in the area without
doing business with the HMO. An HMO's restrictions on dealing with
physicians should be reviewed to confirm that they are ancillary to the

organization's legitimate objectives. It would be proper for the HMO to
establish certain prerequisites for physicians' participation that are
related to the HMO's ability to provide quality care at lower prices, such
as the physicians' consent to reasonable ceilings on the amount of
reimbursement for certain services. However, the HMO's rules need not
be so strict as to prevent doctors from providing adequate patient care.
An HMO, for example, should not be allowed to require doctors to meet
unreasonable quotas for the number of patients they must see in a day.
Such rules are broader than necessary to meet the HMO's objectives for

144. Such a reseller also should not be permitted to single out a particular supplier and demand a
lower price than that demanded of other suppliers. A large reseller can exclude a supplier from the
market just as surely through such discriminatory treatment as through a refusal to deal. An offer to
purchase from a supplier at a price below that which the supplier can afford to sell is tantamount to
no offer at all. If a reseller is willing to accept a particular price from one supplier, it should be
willing to accept the same price from others. A supplier should also not be permitted to demand
patently unreasonable terms of sale and then use the supplier's refusal to agree to the terms as a
pretext for not dealing with the supplier.
145. Of course, before holding a reseller liable for refusing to deal with a supplier, the courts
should confirm that the supplier was just as capable of meeting the reseller's quality and quantity
requirements as the firm ultimately selected by the reseller.
146. Refusals to deal by individual resellers controlling an essential facility would be illegal
forms of monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act, while refusals to deal by the members
of joint ventures controlling such a facility would be illegal conspiracies in restraint of trade under
section 1 of the Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1994); see supra notes 44 & 59 and accompanying text.
147. Indeed, 42% of the small markets in the United States (that is, those with less than 250,000
residents) are currently served by only one HMO. Mark L. Glassman, Can HMOs Wield Market
Power? Assessing Antitrust Liabilities in the Imperfect Market for Health Care Financing, 46 Am.
U. L. Rev. 91, 117 n.169, 130 n.243 (1996).
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delivering more efficient medical care to patients. 4 8 Similarly, a group of
office supply superstores controlling more than fifty percent of the resale
market may decide to form a purchasing cooperative. Such a buying
group should be allowed to seek lower prices and other favorable terms
aggressively and to refuse to deal with suppliers that fail to meet such
terms. 4 9 If, however, a manufacturer of office supplies were willing to
meet those terms, the group should be required to purchase from the
manufacturer. The group's refusal to deal under these circumstances
would constitute a naked exclusion of the manufacturer from the office
supply market.
Instead of setting forth certain prerequisites for the suppliers with
which it is willing to deal, a reseller may simply choose to purchase from
one supplier to the exclusion of all others for a certain period of time.
Such an exclusive dealing arrangement constitutes a categorical decision
by a reseller not to do business with any of the supplier's competitors
during its term. When a reseller establishes the criteria upon which it is
willing to deal, suppliers at least have the opportunity to qualify by
meeting the criteria. Under an exclusive dealing arrangement, however,
all other suppliers are precluded from bidding for a reseller's business,
regardless of their qualifications.
Courts have recognized that, despite their anti-competitive potential,
exclusive arrangements should only be precluded when they foreclose
competitors of the favored supplier from a substantial percentage of the
potential outlets for their products. Other suppliers will not be
competitively harmed if sufficient outlets remain through which they can
148. For a description of how such quotas can harm patient care, see Goldberg, supra note 13, at
A22. Medical insurance companies that cover more than 50% of the patients in a particular area also
should not be allowed to refuse arbitrarily to deal with physicians. It should be acceptable for such
an insurer to attempt to reduce costs by requiring doctors to follow certain reasonable administrative
procedures, such as billing their services through hospitals rather than directly to patients. See
Westchester Radiological Assocs. v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 707 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (analyzing this requirement under rule of reason). However, such an insurer should not be
permitted to refuse to reimburse doctors for reasons unrelated to its administrative efficiency.
Requirements that doctors decline to accept payments from other insurance companies, for example,
should be illegal. Such restrictions are broader than required to insure more efficient billing and
payment of insurance claims.
149. Of course, at some point a buying group's demands of a supplier may become so
unreasonable that they simply constitute a pretext for refusing to deal. If, for example, a buying
group singles out a particular supplier and attempts to impose more stringent prices and terms than
the buying group has sought from its other suppliers, a court may legitimately conclude that the
group is refusing to deal with the supplier for reasons unrelated to its legitimate efficiency
objectives.
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sell their products unencumbered by the exclusive deal. 5 ° Unless an
exclusive dealing arrangement forecloses more than half of the potential
demand for a product, it should be permitted because it is likely to have a
legitimate efficiency-enhancing purpose that outweighs its anticompetitive effects. For the supplier, such an arrangement provides the
ability to plan production schedules more effectively. With an assured
market for its products, the supplier will find it easier to make the capital
investments necessary to improve its production efficiency. For its part, a
reseller can use its commitment to an exclusive dealing arrangement as
leverage to convince a supplier to lower its price, accelerate delivery, or
improve quality.
Thus, in most cases, courts should uphold exclusive dealing
arrangements on their face. However, there are cases in which the burden
should shift to the reseller to prove a legitimate business justification for
an exclusive dealing arrangement. A reseller who controls more than
fifty percent of the demand for a product should not be allowed to refuse
arbitrarily to deal with all but one of the suppliers of that product. Such a
reseller could potentially exclude a supplier from the relevant market by
denying access to its outlets for an extended period of time.' Courts
should confirm whether an essential reseller's refusal to deal is ancillary
to the legitimate objectives of its distribution system. A large reseller like
a superstore can usually achieve such objectives in a less restrictive
manner. Rather than agreeing not to purchase from any of a supplier's
competitors, a superstore could simply agree to purchase a specified
amount of product from the supplier within a particular period of time.
This commitment would give other suppliers an opportunity to bid for
the superstore's excess demand. At the same time, the commitment
would provide the favored supplier with the certainty it needs to plan
production schedules and make capital investments, and it should be
sufficient to induce the supplier to make any pricing or other concessions
required by the superstore. Thus, for a superstore that controls more than

150. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 42-44 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (agreeing that foreclosure of 30% of relevant market is not unreasonable); Gonzales v.
Insignares, 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,701 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (granting summary judgment for
defendant when only 40% of market affected).
151. Exclusive dealing arrangements have been successfully challenged when they have
foreclosed more than 50% of the relevant market. See Kohler Co. v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 1986-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,047 (E.D. Wis. 1986) (issuing preliminary injunction against arrangement
affecting 62% of market); United States v. Dairymen Inc., 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCII) 66,638 (6th
Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (illegality of exclusive contracts affecting 50% of market).
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fifty percent of the potential demand in the relevant market, an exclusive
dealing arrangement would be broader than necessary to achieve the
legitimate objectives of its distribution system. This arrangement should
be deemed illegal as a naked restraint of trade.
2.

Refusals to Dealwith Competitors

An ancillary restraints approach is also an effective means of
determining the legality of resellers' refusal to deal with their own
competitors. Refusals to deal occur when a group of resellers form a
buying group and adopt restrictive entry requirements. Membership rules
may unduly limit competition if the group constitutes an essential facility
that can generate unique efficiencies that are not available to nonmembers.
The relevant antitrust issue for buying cooperatives should not be the
legality of the ventures themselves but the appropriateness of ancillary
restraints, such as membership rules, implemented by the members of the
group. As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Northwest Wholesale,
purchasing joint ventures can generate several distributional efficiencies,
including economies of scale in purchasing and warehousing and the
elimination of redundant facilities.'52 Antitrust analysis should encourage
purchasing joint ventures because, unlike mergers, they can achieve such
efficiencies without eliminating all competition among their partners.'53
Resellers therefore should not be deemed to have violated section 1 of
the Sherman Act simply by forming a buying group with a large
collective market share. Indeed, buying groups can be more effective in
eliminating redundant purchasing functions and in negotiating lower
prices if they include a large number of the resellers in the relevant
market. However, when buying groups include resellers representing
more than fifty percent of the demand in the relevant market, courts
should shift the burden to the groups to demonstrate that any ancillary
restraints implemented by the members are no broader than required to
accomplish the groups' legitimate objectives. By virtue of their control
over the resale market, such groups have the potential to exclude third
parties by adopting overly broad competitive restraints. Thus, a large
buying group should be permitted to reject those suppliers that are
152. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 298
(1985).
153. See supraPart m.C.
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unwilling to meet its demands for favorable terms, 54 but it should not be
allowed to refuse to deal with suppliers that agree to those terms.' 55 An
arbitrary refusal to deal would be unrelated to the group's efficiency
objectives and would constitute a naked exclusion of suppliers from the
relevant market.
Membership rules are another type of ancillary restraint that large
buying groups may use improperly. 56 As the Supreme Court recognized
in Northwest Wholesale, membership restrictions of buying groups that
possess "market power or unique access to a business element essential
for effective competition" have the potential to unduly limit
competition.'57 If resellers representing more than fifty percent of the
purchasing demand in a market are already participating in a buying
group, it would be impossible for excluded firms to form a venture with
similar market power. Non-members could not compete effectively in
the relevant market because they would have no comparable means of
eliminating redundant purchasing costs or obtaining favorable terms of
sale. Courts should therefore require buying groups to prove that their
membership rules are reasonably related to the legitimate objectives of
the group.
Certain limitations on membership should be permitted because they
are necessary for the effectiveness of a buying cooperative. For example,
members of the cooperative must be able to prescribe a minimum
financial capacity, technical expertise, and other qualifications to insure
that firms can participate effectively in the venture. In certain cases,
154. Webster County Mem'l Hosp. v. United Mine Workers, 536 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(comparing fund providing medical care to buying group and upholding fund's negotiation of
maximum per diem price for reimbursement of certain medical services); Letter from William F.
Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Div. of the Department of Justice Business Review, to
B. William Dunlap, Ohio Hospital Association (June 9, 1982) (opining on legality of buying group
in which 80% of not-for-profit hospitals in Ohio pooled their market power for purpose of obtaining
better prices on hospital supplies) (on file with author).
155. See supra Part V.B.1.
156. Membership rules have a benign effect when a buying group is small enough that excluded
firms can join with other non-members to form their own cooperatives with comparable market
power. In such a case, restrictive membership rules actually promote competition by forcing nonmembers to form their own purchasing cooperatives, thus creating greater competition among
resellers to obtain the best prices and terms from suppliers. Because open access requirements
discourage the formation of competing ventures, some commentators have argued that the courts
should only compel access to joint ventures under unusual circumstances. See, e.g., Donald I. Baker,
Compulsory Access to Network Joint Ventures Under the Sherman Act: Rules or Roulette?, 1993
Utah L. Rev. 999, 1080-83.
157. Northwest Wholesale, 472 U.S. at 298.
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however, membership rules may be broader than necessary to insure a
group's efficient operation. These rules should be deemed illegal as
naked restraints of trade. For example, limits on the number of firms that
can join a cooperative may have no purpose other than to prevent
competitors of the current members from participating. Most purchasing
cooperatives do not have inherent capacity limits and can admit new
members with minimal disruption. A purchasing cooperative that already
includes a large number of firms should not find it difficult to add new
members. Indeed, most purchasing cooperatives will become more
efficient as they expand. New members will give a cooperative more
leverage to achieve economies of scale and to negotiate more favorable
terms from suppliers. Because the necessary infrastructure is already in
place, the incremental cost of adding a new member is less than the
incremental benefit of the member's market power. Thus, arbitrary limits
on the number of firms that can join large purchasing cooperatives
usually should be precluded.
C.

Resellers 'Inducement ofRefusals to Deal

Resellers' actions have the greatest potential to harm competition not
when they themselves refuse to deal with third parties but when they
enlist their suppliers to participate in a refusal to deal. A large reseller
may have sufficient leverage to convince a supplier to stop selling to a
competing reseller it considers a competitive threat. Induced refusals to
deal should be illegal on their face because they have an adverse effect
on competition regardless of a reseller's market power. A reseller's
refusal to deal with a supplier, or its exclusion of competitors from a
buying group, can only harm competition when the reseller controls a
resource essential to effective competition in the relevant market. If a
reseller does not control such an essential facility, suppliers and
competitors of the reseller can find alternative firms with which to
deal.'58 A reseller's inducement of a supplier's refusal to deal, on the
other hand, always unduly restricts competition. It is the supplier's
participation, and not the market power of the reseller, that makes an
induced termination so pernicious. When a supplier responds to a
reseller's complaints by terminating one of the reseller's competitors, the
terminated firm will have no alternatives for obtaining the supplier's
products. The firm will be completely excluded from the intrabrand
158. See supra Part V.B.
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market. Consumers will lose forever the advantages of the competition in
prices and services the former dealer provided. In such a case no further
confirmation of the reseller's market power is necessary. This power will
be evident from its success in inducing the supplier to carry out a
termination it othenvise would not have considered.
In reviewing reseller terminations, however, courts must be careful
not to inhibit suppliers from legitimate attempts to enhance their
efficiency in competing against other brands. A supplier is more likely to
terminate a reseller for doing an ineffective job of promoting its products
than to placate another reseller concerned about competition. Such a
termination may be beneficial to consumers because it encourages the
remaining dealers to provide additional services. A termination
motivated by a supplier's need to maintain its competitive efficiency
may be indistinguishable on its face from a termination designed to
placate another reseller. Indeed, it was concern over distinguishing
legitimate from unjustified terminations that led the Supreme Court to
erect such a high hurdle for plaintiffs in Monsanto and Sharp.5 9
An ancillary restraints approach provides a better means of balancing
the interests of suppliers and resellers than the Court's formalistic
approach in Monsanto and Sharp. Under an ancillary restraints approach,
courts can protect suppliers' interests without denying resellers an
opportunity to challenge unjustified terminations. The proposed analysis
would allow courts to determine whether a termination was effected by a
supplier for its own independent reasons or merely to meet the
anticompetitive concerns of a reseller. Thus, courts could give resellers
an opportunity to prove the anticompetitive nature of their terminations
without fear that suppliers would be deemed liable for engaging in
legitimate conduct.
Courts have deemed naked horizontal agreements affecting price,
output, or other elements of competition per se illegal because their only
purpose is to limit commercial rivalry. 6 On the other hand, courts have
treated vertical agreements more leniently because they can be intended
for purposes other than to restrict competition. 6 ' This dichotomy
159. See supranotes 89-102 and accompanying text.
160. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (holding horizontal price fixing per
se illegal); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (holding horizontal territorial
allocation per se illegal); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (ruling
horizontal agreement to limit supply of surplus gasoline per se illegal).
161. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). As the First
Circuit explained in M&H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp.:
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between horizontal and vertical conduct provides an effective means of
determining when dealer terminations are intended to promote a
supplier's efficiency and when they are designed merely to limit
competition among resellers. 62 Terminations originating with a supplier
should be deemed vertical and upheld as ancillary to the legitimate
efficiency objectives of the supplier's distribution system. Terminations
induced by competing resellers should be deemed horizontal and
precluded on their face as naked restraints of trade unrelated to any
efficiency objectives. 63

It is important to distinguish between "horizontal" restraints, i.e., agreements between
competitors at the same level of market structure, and "vertical' restraints, i.e., combinations of
persons at different levels of the market structure such as manufacturers and distributors ....
Horizontal restraints alone have been characterized as "naked restraints of trade with no purpose
except stifling competition,". . . and, therefore, per se violations of the Sherman Act. On the
other hand ...vertical restrictions... promote interbrand competition by allowing a
manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of its products ....They are,
therefore, to be examined under the rule ofreason standard.
733 F.2d 973, 978 (Ist Cir. 1984) (quoting Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 131 (2d
Cir. 1978) (en bane)).
162. For a discussion of the relevance of the horizontal/vertical dichotomy to distributor
terminations, see Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Reformed Antitrust Approach to Distributor
Terminations, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 271 (1992); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Sharp Dealing: The
Horizontal/VerticalDichotomy in DistributorTermination Cases, 38 Emory L.J. 311 (1989).
163. Some courts have recognized the utility of the horizontal/vertical distinction. See, e.g.,
Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190, 1197 (6th Cir. 1982) ("A determination
of the source of the restraints imposed ...will expose the purpose of such restraints."); Id. at 1197
n.10 ("A restraint imposed by distributors is generally for the purpose of restricting supply or price
competition... whereas restraints imposed intrabrand by a manufacturer may be imposed for the
purpose of competing more effectively in the interbrand market."). As the Third Circuit stated in
Cernuto, Inc. v. United CabinetCorp., "[w]hen a manufacturer acts on its own, in pursuing its own
marketing strategy, it is seeking to compete with other manufacturers by imposing what may be
defended as reasonable vertical restraints." 595 F.2d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 1979). This would appear to
be the rationale of the Sylvania decision. However, if the action of a manufacturer or other supplier
is taken at the direction of its customer, the restraint becomes primarily horizontal in nature in that
one customer is seeking to suppress its competition by utilizing the power of a common supplier.
Therefore, although the termination in such a situation is itself a vertical restraint, the desired impact
is horizontal and on the dealer, not the manufacturer, level. Sylvania, in fact, specifically recognized
the need to distinguish horizontal from vertical restrictions. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58 n.28; see
also Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 755 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("I have emphasized in this dissent the difference between restrictions imposed in pursuit of a
manufacturer's structuring of its product distribution, and those imposed at the behest of retailers
who care less about the general efficiency of a product's promotion than their own profit margins.").
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1.

Vertical Terminations

Courts are justified in deeming vertical terminations legal on their face
because their predominant competitive effect is beneficial. Vertical
terminations are ancillary to the efficiency-enhancing objectives of the
distribution relationship between a supplier and its dealers. In the
absence of pressure from third parties, a supplier has no interest in taking
actions that reduce its efficiency in the interbrand market.' 64 When a
supplier makes its own decisions on the retention of certain resellers, it is
attempting to enhance its efficiency in competing against other brands.
As long as a supplier has such a purpose, its actions should be upheld as
ancillary restraints. In such cases, the interbrand benefit of the restraint
clearly outweighs any restriction of intrabrand competition.
Courts should recognize that most conduct by suppliers is vertical
rather than horizontal. A supplier has no independent reason to terminate
a distributor that is performing effectively. As the Supreme Court
recognized in Sylvania, the manufacturer's desire to insure its
competitiveness in the interbrand market will act as a check on its
limitation of intrabrand competition. 65 A supplier has a natural interest
in making its products as attractive to consumers as possible. Because
suppliers ignore consumer preferences at their peril, they will be inclined
to continue to deal with the types of resellers consumers favor. If
consumers prefer to buy through low-priced outlets, a supplier ultimately
will have to deal with discounters or otherwise suffer a general decline in
demand for its products. If consumers prefer higher service resellers, the
supplier must respond by encouraging such services. A supplier will
restrict intrabrand competition only when it believes that higher resale
prices will allow dealers to increase services in a way that will make its
products more attractive to consumers. The supplier must be careful to
maintain the right mix of resale prices and services consumers desire.
The supplier will be forced to change its policy if it misreads consumer
preferences and restricts intrabrand competition to such an extent that
resale price increases reduce the overall demand for the supplier's
products.

164. Economic studies have demonstrated that a supplier's only independent purpose for
implementing vertical restrictions is to enhance the competitiveness of its distribution system. See
Sharp, 485 U.S. at 724-25; Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-57.
165. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
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A natural system of checks and balances insures the beneficial impact
of distributor terminations independently effected by suppliers. A
supplier can be relied on to pursue its own self-interest in minimizing the
adverse competitive effect of a distributor termination. A supplier would
not proceed on its own with a termination whose only effect would be to
reduce intrabrand competition and increase resale prices. When a
supplier independently decides to terminate a reseller, and consequently
reduces intrabrand competition, it can safely be assumed that it expects,
in return, some offsetting benefit to consumers in the form of increased
services. Thus, a supplier may refuse to deal with an individual reseller
that is not providing the required services, or it may terminate an entire
group of resellers in order to limit distribution to a smaller group that can
provide services more effectively.'66 The elimination of such resellers
from the intrabrand market is justified by the enhanced effectiveness of
the balance of the supplier's distribution system in competing against
other brands.
2.

The "But For" CausalStandard

It takes a significant exercise of market power for a reseller to induce
a supplier to act against its own self-interest and terminate an effective
distributor that it otherwise would have retained. Resellers rarely possess
such market power.'67 It is therefore appropriate for courts to presume the
legality of actions taken by suppliers against their dealers and to put a
heavy burden on the plaintiff to prove that a restraint was actually
imposed horizontally by one or more other resellers. Indeed, the plaintiff
should be required to prove that, "but for" the inducement of a rival
reseller, the supplier would not have taken any action against the
plaintiff.'68

166. General Motors, for example, is currently reducing its national network of 8,500 dealers in
order to improve its delivery and servicing of automobiles. Henderson & Reitman, supra note 5, at
Bi. Approximately 1,000 of General Motors dealers are expected to be terminated in connection
with the reorganization. Blumenstein, supranote 5, at A3.
167. In Sharp, the Court stated that "[rietail market power is rare, because of the usual presence of
interbrand competition and other dealers." 485 U.S. at 727 n.2 (citing Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54); see
also State Oil Co. v. Kahn & Kahn & Assocs., Inc., No. 96-871, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 6705, at *25
(Nov. 4, 1997) ("Such retail market power may in fact be uncommon.") (citing Sharp, 485 U.S. at
727 n.2).
168. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Distributor Terminations Pursuant to ConspiraciesAmong a
Supplier and ComplainingDistributors:A Suggested Antitrust Analysis, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 297,
310-11 (1982) (proposing "but for" standard).
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Under this standard, a plaintiff would have to demonstrate that the
anticompetitive demands of competing resellers were the proximate
cause of a supplier's action. This approach would protect suppliers
against undue liability for implementing legitimate vertical restrictions.
The "but for" test would pose a formidable barrier to plaintiffs. They
would have to prove not only that a supplier agreed with one or more
resellers to effect a termination, but also that the only reason for the
termination was the resellers' desire to avoid intrabrand competition.
Terminated resellers would have to demonstrate that other resellers'
complaints were the determinative factor in their termination. In making
the "but for" analysis, a court should assume "that that factor was present
at the time of the event, and then ask whether, even if that factor had
been absent, the event nevertheless would have transpired in the same
' The test thus forces a court to consider how a supplier would
way."169
have acted in the absence of the complaints. If a supplier would have
terminated the reseller had it learned of its conduct from a source other
than the complaining reseller, the complaint would not be deemed the
proximate cause of the termination. In such a case, the net effect on
competition would be no different than if the supplier and complaining
reseller had never entered into an agreement.
Such a strict standard should resolve the Court's concern in Monsanto
and Sharp that suppliers could be held liable for taking actions against
resellers designed to enhance their interbrand efficiency. Under a "but
for" approach, a supplier would only be liable when its sole motive for a
termination was to placate a reseller concerned about competition from a
rival. A supplier could protect itself by documenting in advance its
legitimate independent motives for a distributor termination. It would be
difficult for a terminated reseller to prevail under the "but for" test when
such documentation exists. Adoption of the horizontal/vertical
dichotomy thus should not chill suppliers' legitimate efforts to enhance
the efficiency of their distribution systems.
Courts are well-equipped to determine whether a terminated reseller
has met its burden of proof under a "but for" standard by demonstrating
that the anticompetitive demands of rival resellers were the motive for
the supplier's actions. 7 ° Courts are very familiar with "but for" tests,
169. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989) (construing proximate cause
analysis in employment discrimination action).
170. Some courts and commentators, however, believe that it is too difficult for courts to
distinguish permissible motives from illegal intent in termination cases. See Lomar Wholesale
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having used them for years in proving cause-in-fact in tort actions.' 7 '
Triers of fact are accustomed to determining issues of purpose and
motivation. They are more capable of deciding these issues than
resolving the complex economic problems raised in standard rule of
reason cases.172 Indeed, most juries simply are incapable of performing
the type of economic analysis required under a full rule of reason
approach.73 Courts traditionally have recognized that motive and intent
are significant factors in antitrust cases. 74 As Justice Stevens stated in his
dissent in Sharp, "[i]n antitrust, as in many other areas of the law,
motivation matters and factfinders are able to distinguish bad from good
intent."' 75 Courts have deemed purpose to be a particularly important
factor in group boycott cases where the parties may have different
competitive motives for participating in the boycott. One court has
concluded that in all boycott cases "the touchstone of per se illegality has
176
been the purpose and effect of the arrangement in question."'
In other legal areas, courts routinely resolve cases involving mixed
motives. For example, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,77
courts must determine whether employment decisions are based on
objective standards or on such discriminatory bases as race, religion, sex,
or national origin. Employers' decisions on hiring and promotion are

Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter's Gourmet Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582, 594 (8th Cir. 1987); Valley Liquors,
Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 1982); Peter M. Gerhart, The
"Competitive Advantages " Explanationfor IntrabrandRestraints:An Antitrust Analysis, 1981 Duke
L.J., 417, 439 ("Focusing on subjective motive.., is risky and ineffectual: not only can evidence of
purpose be manipulated, but the evidence is usually ambiguous.").
171. Harry S. Gerla, Discounters and the Antitrust Laws: FacesSometimes Should Make Cases,
12 J. Corp. L. 1, 15 (1986).
172. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-12 (1972).
173. Jean W. Bums, Rethinking the "Agreement" Element in Vertical Antitrust Restraints, 51
Ohio St. L.J., 1,37-38 (1990).
174. Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464,473 (1962).
175. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 754 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-11
(1985)); McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 243 (1980); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-26 n.59 (1940); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Case for Presuming the Legality of Quality Motivated
Restrictions on Distribution, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 4, 16-19 (1988).
176. E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 187 (5th
Cir. 1972).
177. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (1994).
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often based on a mixture of legitimate and illegal motives.'
Distinguishing which motive predominates in a Title VII case is no more
difficult than determining whether a reseller's termination was motivated
by a supplier's independent purposes or by another reseller's
anticompetitive desires.
3.

HorizontalTerminations

Once a plaintiff meets the "but for" test and proves that its termination
was horizontally-induced by a competing reseller, the termination should
be deemed conclusively illegal without any opportunity for rebuttal by
the defendant. Horizontally-induced terminations are so obviously
anticompetitive that they can be precluded on their face without any
consideration of their specific adverse effects. Indeed, they possess the
classic characteristics of per se conduct. As in other per se cases, the
courts are justified in condemning horizontal terminations without any
specific consideration of their likely competitive effects, because in
nearly all cases they will prove to be unduly restrictive of competition.'79
The only purpose of such terminations is to restrict competition between
a reseller and the terminated firm. No conceivable efficiency-enhancing
objective exists for an induced termination. If the termination were
necessary to ensure more effective promotion of its products, the
supplier would have terminated the distributor on its own. The only
purpose of an induced termination is to free a reseller from competing
with a more efficient rival. In such cases the terminated firm is being
eliminated not because of its poor performance in the interbrand market
but because of its aggressive competition in the intrabrand market.
Consumers lose the advantages of intrabrand competition from the
terminated reseller without receiving any compensating benefit in the
interbrand market. The supplier's conduct has nothing to do with
promoting its efficiency and everything to do with assuaging a reseller's
concern about aggressive competition from a rival. Unlike a supplier, a
reseller is not motivated to enhance interbrand competition and is usually
driven by a desire to restrict intrabrand competition as much as possible
in order to protect its profit margins.' In the case of an induced
178. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 246 (1989) (calling these "mixed
motives case[s]").
179. For a discussion of the rationale for such a per se approach to competitive conduct, see supra
notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
180. As Professor Areeda has stated:
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termination, "the harm to intrabrand competition... is both immediate
and apparent, with no countervailing stimulation of interbrand
competition, the usual saving grace of a vertical restraint." '81 In such an
event, a reseller may be terminated not because it failed to provide
adequate customer services, but because it had lower prices, was more
efficient, or was more adept than the instigating reseller at sensing and
responding to consumer preferences.
Terminations that originate with competing resellers amount to naked
restraints of trade whose only purpose is to suppress intrabrand
competition. In such cases, the reseller is not acting as a partner with the
supplier in the interbrand market. Instead, it is promoting its own interest
as an independent entrepreneur by avoiding intrabrand competition from
a rival. The restraint is therefore unrelated to any legitimate integration.
The supplier's participation may lend a superficial vertical appearance to
the scheme, but such conduct is just as harmful to competition as the
horizontal agreements courts traditionally deemed per se illegal. If, for
example, AutoNation used its leverage as a large purchaser to induce
General Motors not to sell automobiles to dealers that were under-cutting
AutoNation's prices, this conduct would be indistinguishable from the
dealers' actions that were found to be per se illegal in the General
Motors case.'
A rule of facial illegality for horizontally-induced terminations is
appropriate because, under the rule of reason, a reseller and supplier
could escape liability if the supplier did not possess a substantial share of

From the policy viewpoint, it can matter greatly whether manufacturer or dealer interests are
being served. The former is more likely to seek efficient distribution, which stimulates
interbrand competition; the latter is more likely to seek excess profits, which dampen interbrand
competition. Accordingly, antitrust policy can be more hospitable toward manufacturer efforts
to control dealer prices, customers, or territories than toward the efforts of dealers to control
their competitors through the manufacturer.
7 Philip A. Areeda, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Applications
§ 1457, at 167-68 (1986); see also Girardi v. Gates Rubber Co. Sales Div., Inc., 325 F.2d 196, 200
(9th Cir. 1963) (stating that "it is normally the competitor who is being hurt by price cutting who is
likely to seek coercive action against the competitor who is hurting or likely to hurt him"); Arnold
Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 700 F. Supp. 838, 841 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (stating that
"[a] horizontal agreement by dealers.., is only motivated by the dealers [sic] desire to eliminate
intrabrand competition within the region and thereby to maximize profits. Such agreements have no
pro-competitive motivation, and are consistently found illegal per se.").
181. Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 141 (2d Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting).
182. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
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the interbrand market.'83 The supplier's share of the interbrand market,
however, is irrelevant; it is the reseller's power in the intrabrand market
that is critical. The adverse competitive effect of an induced termination
occurs in the intrabrand, not in the interbrand, market. The relevant issue
is whether the reseller possessed sufficient intrabrand power to induce
the supplier to effect a termination it otherwise would not have
considered. Although it has traditionally been rare for resellers to possess
such power,'84 resellers are now gaining the type of leverage that would
allow them to induce a supplier to proceed with a termination the
supplier otherwise would have foregone. Preferring to keep both dealers,
the supplier nevertheless may conclude that "terminating the plaintiff
hurts him less (considering sales lost, transaction costs in finding and
perhaps training a replacement, and any spillover effects upon his
relations with other dealers) than losing the complainer's patronage."' 185
A reseller's leverage is particularly strong when it buys more products
from the supplier than the terminated dealer. The FTC pointed out in In
re Toys "R'" Us, that Toys "R" Us was the largest customer of toy
manufacturers and that the manufacturers would have had difficulty in
finding an alternative buyer.186 Given Toys "R" Us's leverage over the
manufacturers, they had little choice but to go along with its demands
that they cease selling toys to warehouse clubs.' 87 Resellers such as Toys
"R" Us should not be able to escape liability for induced terminations
simply by arguing that the relevant supplier did not have a substantial
share of the interbrand market.
Thus, once the "but for" test is met, courts should dispense with a
market power inquiry into a horizontally-induced termination. The
market power of the reseller in the intrabrand market will be evident
from its success in inducing the termination. In United States v. E.I
Dupont de Nemours & Co., the Supreme Court defined market power as

183. In Robinson-Bock DistributingCo. v. Pioneer/EclipseCorp., for example, the court held that
a terminated janitorial supply store could not prevail in a rule of reason case because the
manufacturer held only four percent of the "janitorial supply industry as a whole." Nos. 92-2578, 922585, 1993 WL 326365, at *5 (7th Cir. Oct. 19, 1993); see also Bi-Rite Oil Co., Inc. v. Farm Bureau
Coop. Ass'n. Inc., 908 F.2d 200 (7th Cir. 1990) (denying claim of unlawful termination by gasoline
service stations on grounds that refiner did not possess large share of total refining capacity in
relevant market).
184. See supra note 156 and accompanying text
185. Areeda, supra note 180, §§ 1457a, 1457b, at 166-67.
186. No. 9273, 1997 FTC LEXIS 284 (FTC Sept. 25, 1997).
187. Id. at "143-44.
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the "power to control price or exclude competition."' 88 A reseller
excludes competition when it induces a supplier to cease dealing with
one of its competitors, and therefore a court can be confident that it
possesses the requisite market power.
Some courts and commentators have argued that horizontally-induced
terminations should not be illegal on their face because they restrict only
intrabrand competition, which the Sylvania Court indicated was not as
important as interbrand competition.' 89 Intrabrand competition, however,
has enough advantages to make it worthy of protection, and courts
should not allow restrictions of such competition that have no offsetting
efficiency justifications. Any consumer who is familiar with a retailer's
willingness to match the sale prices of a competitor can testify to the
advantages of intrabrand competition. Free competition among resellers
benefits consumers by reducing resale prices and encouraging marketing
innovations and more efficient forms of retailing. Competition also
stimulates a greater output of services and adds to the variety and range
of choices available to consumers. Indeed, competition at the resale level
can reduce consumer prices and increase customer services even more
efficiently than interbrand competition at the supplier level. There is a
strong impetus toward efficiency in intrabrand markets because of the
many different ways in which resale costs can be reduced. Resellers are
more keenly aware of, and better able to respond to, consumers' needs
and preferences than are upstream suppliers. When they are allowed to
compete freely, resellers are likely to develop innovative means of
delivering services consumers desire. The superstores developed in the
mid-1980s are only one example of new methods of distribution
conceived by resellers. Such innovations also have included department
stores, supermarkets, mail order firms, and boutiques."90 In certain cases,
intrabrand discounting can even reduce prices in the interbrand market.
When discounting of one brand is prevalent, resellers of other brands

188. 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
189. See, e.g., Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 728 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(granting summary judgment for defendant despite evidence that manufacturer ceased dealing with
plaintiff because of defendant's complaints about its low prices); Robert L. Steiner, Intrabrand
Competition-StepchildofAntitrust, 36 Antitrust Bull. 155, 155-56 (1991) (describing low priority
courts and commentators currently accord intrabrand competition).
190. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Oversight Hearings Before Subcomm. on Monopolies and
CommercialLaw ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong., 75 (1986).
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may exert pressure on their suppliers to lower wholesale prices so that
they can remain competitive with the discount brand. 9 '
The loss of even a single reseller from the intrabrand market will
deprive consumers of some of these benefits of intrabrand competition.'9 2
When a reseller is terminated because its aggressive competition has
made it the object of a competing reseller's concern, the damage to
consumers may be even greater.'93 In such a case consumers lose the
option of purchasing from a firm that was the most innovative (and thus
the greatest competitive threat to its rivals) in devising lower-cost means
of delivering products and services. The warehouse clubs the toy
manufacturers terminated in response to the ultimatum from Toys "R"
Us, for example, were operating at gross margins of only 9-12%
compared to 20% for discount drugstores, 25% for mass merchandisers,
and 40-50% for department stores. 94 It is thus appropriate to deem
illegal on its face a horizontal termination that eliminates intrabrand
competition without any compensating benefit in the interbrand market.
A horizontal termination should be illegal on its face regardless of
whether the power to induce a supplier's action is exercised by one or
several resellers. A rule of facial illegality is appropriate when it is

demonstrated that a manufacturer's only reason for a termination was the
satisfaction of a reseller's anticompetitive demands, and, "[o]nce that
191. This phenomenon occurred in the jeans industry after Levi Strauss eliminated resale price
restrictions on its distributors. Soon thereafter, a number of discount outlets reduced their prices on
Levis. These price cuts triggered reductions in the prices of competing brands ofjeans. See Steiner,
supra note 189, at 177. Similarly, after Sealy Mattress eliminated its exclusive territories and resale
price restrictions for distributors of its mattresses, the prices paid by consumers for Sealy mattresses
fell by as much as 20-30%. In response, competing mattress manufacturers were forced to reduce
their prices. See id. at 187. One commentator has described how vigorous intrabrand competition
forces retailers to pressure suppliers to reduce interbrand prices: "[tihe retailers look to the
manufacturers to provide them with the margin dollars that consumers won't." Bill Saporito, Why the
Price Wars Never End, Fortune, Mar. 23, 1992, at 68, 70.
192. A planned amalgamation of Ford dealers in the Indianapolis area into a single Ford
dealership illustrates how consumers can be harmed by a loss of intrabrand competition. The
amalgamation will eliminate all competition among those dealers in the resale of Ford vehicles. An
observer has pointed out that the dealers' organization in Indianapolis will be able to raise prices on
automobiles that are in short supply without fear of competition from other Ford dealers: "If Ford
has a hot product, like the Explorer and the Expedition, it would be very tempting to charge
whatever you want." Henderson, supra note 26, at A2 (quoting Ramsay H. Gillman, President,
National Association of Automobile Dealers).
193. In FTC v. Staples, Inc., the court pointed out that "the elimination of a particularly aggressive
competitor" was an "important consideration when analyzing possible anti-competitive effects" of a
merger between two office supply superstores. 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1082-83 (D.D.C. 1997).
194. See In re Toys "R" Us, No. 9273, 1997 FTC LEXIS 284, at *8-10 (FTC Sept. 25, 1997).
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objective [is] shown, the number of the conspirators and their posturewhether vertical or horizontal-has no legal significance."' 95 If a single
reseller has sufficient market power to convince a manufacturer to
terminate a rival dealer it otherwise would have retained, the effect on
intrabrand competition is just as adverse as if several resellers had
induced the termination.' 96 The success of the conspiracy depends on the
reseller's ability to enlist the cooperation of the supplier, not that of
competing resellers.' 97
4.

Inducing Other Adverse Treatment

A reseller may induce a supplier to take certain actions against a
competitor that are less drastic than a complete termination, but that
nevertheless limit the firm's ability to compete on equal terms with the
reseller. This conduct is just as pernicious as an induced termination
because it limits intrabrand competition without any compensating
beneficial effects in the interbrand market. Such conduct should be
deemed illegal on its face if a plaintiff can demonstrate that the supplier
would not have engaged in the conduct but for the inducement of a
competing reseller. A reseller may, for example, convince a supplier to
sell to its competitors at a higher price or on other less favorable terms
than those available to the reseller. While a reseller's negotiation of a
favorable price for itself is ancillary to the legitimate objectives of its
distribution system,"' a reseller exceeds those objectives when it requires
a supplier to sell to its competitors at a higher price or upon other
discriminatory terms. 9 A reseller does not need to disadvantage its
195. Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 140 (2d Cir. 1978) (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting).
196. Commenting on Catalano,Inc. v. Target Sales, 446 U.S. 643 (1980), Professor Areeda has
written:
That the complainer was a single firm did not weaken the "horizontal" characterization.... The
court's implicit theory was that an agreement arose when the manufacturer bowed to the
complainer's will. In that situation, the "horizontal" characterization is appropriate to capture
the fact that dealer interests as opposed to those of the manufacturer were being served.
Areeda, supra note 180, § 1457d, at 174.
197. "[The harmful effect on the victim of the boycott ... does not depend on the existence of
more than one competitor but upon the anticompetitive agreement between the competitor and the
supplier." Oreck, 579 F.2d at 140 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
198. See supraPart WV.B.
199. If a group of resellers and a group of suppliers enter into a broad horizontal conspiracy to
deny favorable prices to a certain type of reseller, such conduct may be deemed to constitute a form
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competitors in order to deliver products to consumers more efficiently;
the reseller need only negotiate the most favorable prices and terms for
itself."' When a reseller requires that a supplier discriminate against its
competitors, the reseller does not, as a consequence, become more
efficient in the interbrand market. The adverse effect of the reseller's
conduct is not off-set by any efficiency benefit. The Supreme Court
recognized the pernicious nature of such conduct in Klor's, where it
deemed per se illegal a retailer's attempt to convince a manufacturer to
sell to its competitors at discriminatory prices and upon unfavorable
terms.2"' Similarly, under the ancillary restraints approach, courts should
deem illegal on its face any attempt by resellers to restrict free
competition from their rivals, whether it be by complete exclusion from
the market or by the imposition of
terms that make it impractical for
22
them to compete on an equal basis.
5.

ProvingHorizontalor Vertical Cause

It should not be difficult for a court to distinguish between verticallyand horizontally-motivated terminations. The "but for" standard will
protect suppliers from having to face a jury on illegitimate claims while
of per se illegal price fixing. In a recent case, In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust
Litigation, the Seventh Circuit allowed retail pharmacies to proceed to trial against manufacturers
and wholesalers of prescription drugs under such a theory. 73 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
221 (7th Cir. Aug. 15, 1997). The drug manufacturers allegedly included the wholesalers in a
conspiracy to charge higher prices to pharmacies than to hospitals, HIBOs and other large customers.
Id. at 221. The court found sufficient evidence that such price discrimination was "the result not of
individual decisions by manufacturers.., but of an agreement to practice price discrimination." Id.
at 222. The court concluded that the agreement among the manufacturers and wholesalers, if proven
at trial, would constitute a form of per se illegal price fixing. Id. at 228.
200. Thus, apart from any consideration of price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act,
it would not be illegal under the Sherman Act for a reseller to negotiate any volume discounts it
wished, as long as it did not prohibit the supplier from making the same discounts available to its
competitors.
201. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. at 207, 209-10 (1959).
202. A reseller disadvantaged by the imposition of discriminatory terms could sue its supplier and
the inducing reseller under the Robinson-Patman Act for price discrimination. See 15 U.S.C. § 1313(b) (1994). However, it is difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in Robinson-Patman cases, because
they must prove that a discrimination in price has an adverse effect on competition in the relevant
market. See 15 U.S.C. § 13-13(b). Just as it often could not prove an adverse effect in the interbrand
market under a traditional rule of reason approach (see supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text),
a disadvantaged reseller would likely find it difficult to show under the Robinson-Patman Act that
competition in the interbrand market was adversely affected as a result of the higher price it had to
pay. Thus, a per se approach under section 1 of the Sherman Act is more likely to deter resellers
from inducing discriminatory prices.
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giving terminated resellers a fair opportunity to have their meritorious
claims considered by the fact-finder.
A terminated reseller should not be able to meet its burden of proof
under the "but for" standard and reach a jury without clear evidence that
a supplier was induced to effect a termination it otherwise would have
foregone. For example, courts should not infer horizontal causation
simply from the fact that a supplier terminates a reseller after receiving
complaints from competitors. It is natural and appropriate for a supplier
to be concerned about and react to complaints from its distributors about
another distributor's competitive activities. Such conduct may simply
indicate that the supplier shares its resellers' concerns that the distributor
is not effectively promoting the supplier's products. A supplier should
also be able to use the timing of complaints to demonstrate that it had a
legitimate independent purpose for a termination. In EdwardJ. Sweeney
& Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., for example, the court failed to find liability
where the complaints had commenced a full five years before a supplier
took any action to terminate a reseller.0 3 The lapse of time between the
commencement of the complaints and the termination raised the
inference that the supplier had acted independently. 2°4
In order to create a jury issue under the "but for" standard, a plaintiff
must combine evidence on the timing of complaints with other
indications of horizontal inducement. The substance of the complaints
themselves often will indicate the parties' anticompetitive purpose. The
complaints may reveal more than a reseller's simple dissatisfaction with
a rival's discounting. The reseller may expressly request that the supplier
terminate the plaintiff and may threaten to condition future purchases on
the supplier's compliance. The evidence of horizontal cause will be
particularly strong when such an ultimatum is delivered by several
resellers or by a single reseller that purchases a greater volume of
products from the supplier than the plaintiff. Indeed, it was an ultimatum
from the larger of two competing resellers that caused the termination in
Sharp, and such evidence would be sufficient to meet the "but for"
standard under the approach proposed in this Article. 5 Under such
circumstances the plaintiff should be able to raise an inference that, but

203. 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980).
204. See id. at 114.
205. See supra Part V.C.2.
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°6
for the ultimatum, the supplier would not have terminated the plaintiff.
Even when the plaintiff has introduced evidence of an ultimatum, a
supplier should still have an opportunity to rebut the inference of
horizontal cause before the jury by demonstrating that it had its own
reasons for acceding to the threats of a distributor. A supplier should
prevail if it can show that it terminated the plaintiff for violating a valid
pre-existing distribution policy. The supplier, for example, may have had
an express policy requiring distributors to provide certain customer
services, or the supplier may have sought to ensure services by
precluding distributors from competing against each other for particular
customers or in certain territories. A manufacturer should not be liable
for terminating a distributor that fails to observe pre-existing policies,
even if the termination occurs after a complaint, or even an ultimatum,
from another distributor. Although the distributor may have
anticompetitive reasons for the threat, the manufacturer may feel
compelled to effect the termination to insure the continued viability of its
distribution policy. In such cases the termination should be deemed
ancillary to the legitimate purposes of the supplier's distribution
system. 0 7 Thus, if a manufacturer can prove that it had implemented
territorial or customer restrictions in order to prevent free-riding, an
ultimatum from the distributors requiring the manufacturer to enforce
these restrictions should not give rise to antitrust liability.
The manufacturer's evidence, however, must show that it introduced a
restrictive distribution policy prior to the complaints and that it
terminated the plaintiff in a legitimate effort to enforce such a policy.
General after-the-fact statements about the manufacturer's concern for
free-riding should not suffice. 20 8 The history of the supplier's
206. In Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse v. Belk Bros. Co., for example, a supplier was denied
summary judgment on the claim that it violated section 1 of the Sherman Act for terminating a
discounter after its largest distributor threatened to discontinue future purchases. 621 F. Supp. 224
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). Similarly, in In re Toys "'R" Us, the FTC found Toys "R" Us liable for inducing
toy manufacturers not to deal with warehouse clubs. No. 9273, 1997 FTC LEXIS 284 (FTC Sept. 25,
1997). The FTC pointed out that Toys "R" Us was the largest customer of the toy manufacturers and
that the manufacturers would have had difficulty in replacing Toys "R" Us as a purchaser. See supra
notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
207. For example, in O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., Apple Computer had banned mail
order sales of its computers after several of its dealers had complained of price competition from
such outlets. 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1986). In upholding Apple's conduct, the court relied on
Apple's pre-existing marketing strategy to deal only with those distributors that could provide
customer services. Id. at 1468.
208. In Corn-Tel, Inc. v. DuKane Corp., the court held the manufacturer liable because it could
not show an independent reason for terminating its distributor for territorial incursions into another

Washington Law Review

Vol. 73:799, 1998

relationship with the plaintiff and other distributors may reveal whether
in fact the supplier did have a real policy prior to the time of the
complaints. The supplier, for example, may have previously warned the
plaintiff about violations of its distribution policy or taken actions
against other distributors which committed such violations. If, on the
other hand, the supplier never discussed the policy with the plaintiff
prior to the termination or allowed other distributors to violate the policy
with impunity, a jury may be less willing to accept the supplier's
argument that it acted independently." 9
6.

Reconciling the ProposedApproach with Sylvania, Monsanto,
and Sharp

The proposed facial illegality of horizontally-induced terminations is
not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's conclusion in Sylvania that
interbrand competition should be the "primary concern of antitrust
law. '210 It is true that only intrabrand competition is restricted when a
supplier terminates or takes other adverse actions against a reseller at the
behest of a rival. Interbrand competition is not limited under such
circumstances. The supplier's remaining resellers will be just as free after
the termination to compete against other brands. Sylvania, however, does
not require that a restraint be upheld when it has no interbrand effect.
Nor did the Court hold that a restriction's effect on intrabrand
competition should be disregarded. Sylvania merely recognized that the
reduction of intrabrand competition caused by vertical restrictions was
justified by the corresponding stimulation of interbrand competition.2" '
Under Sylvania, a court must balance the negative intrabrand effects of a
restraint against its beneficial interbrand effects. 2 2 The Court in Sylvania
assumed that, since interbrand competition is more important, its

distributor's area. 669 F.2d 404, 410-11 (6th Cir. 1982). The court relied on the fact that the
manufacturer had not previously implemented a program of restricted distribution. Id.
209. In finding the manufacturer liable in Monsanto, the Court referred to the fact that "Monsanto
never discussed with Spray-Rite prior to the termination the distributorship criteria that were the
alleged basis for the action." Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 767 (1984).
210. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36,52 n.19 (1977).
211. See id. at 54-55.
212. See id. at 57 n.27. Although Sylvania only referred to the balancing test in a cursory manner,
the lower federal courts have construed Sylvania to require such an approach. See, e.g., Valley
Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982); Muenster Butane, Inc. v.
Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1981).
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promotion should trump any adverse intrabrand effects. 1 3 If, however, a
restraint's only effect is to restrict intrabrand competition, there will be
no positive interbrand effect to weigh in the balance, and the restraint
should be deemed illegal without any further consideration. 2 4 Indeed, in
Sylvania the Court expressly reaffirmed General Motors and Topco, in
which it had applied the per se rule to horizontal restrictions that
eliminated intrabrand competition without any compensating interbrand
effects. 1 5
The facial illegality of horizontally-induced terminations is consistent
with mixed group boycott cases such as Klor's and General Motors.
Although a mixed group boycott involves firms at different distribution
levels, courts have pointed out that "it is the pernicious horizontal thrust
of the activity-the effort by a conspirator or conspirators to exclude or
coerce the trade practices of competitors-that condemns [group]
boycotts to per se prohibition., 21 6 In Klor's and General Motors, the
Supreme Court looked beyond the outward vertical form of the
conspiracies and dispensed with a market power analysis because the
213. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54.
214. As the Cernuto court stated, "interbrand competition... has been labeled the 'primary
concern of antitrust law'. ... Nonetheless, intrabrand competition... has not been of so little
importance as never to merit the protection of a per se rule." Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp.,
595 F.2d 164, 166 n.11 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing Sylvania, 433 U.S. at52 n.19).
215. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58 n.28. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent in Sharp:
Intrabrand competition can benefit the consumer, and it is therefore important to insure that a
manufacturer's motive for a vertical restriction is not simply to acquiesce in his distributors'
desires to limit competition among themselves. The Supreme Court has recognized that
restrictions on intrabrand competition can only be tolerated because of the countervailing
positive impact on interbrand competition.
Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 749 n.14 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Piraino, supra note 175, at 17). One recent Supreme Court case has recognized the
pernicious effects of horizontally-induced restraints in the intrabrand market. In Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Image Technical Services, Inc., the Court held that an adverse impact on intrabrand competition
alone was sufficient to prove the illegality of a vertical restraint. 504 U.S. 451, 479 (1992). The
plaintiff had alleged that Kodak had illegally tied the purchase of its replacement parts to the
purchase of repair services for Kodak micrographic equipment. Id. at 459. Kodak had adopted a
policy under which it would only sell replacement parts to resellers who would agree to have Kodak
repair the equipment. Id. at 458. The Court concluded that the intrabrand market for Kodak
replacement parts was the relevant market for determining whether Kodak had sufficient economic
power to coerce equipment owners into purchasing both replacement parts and repair services. Id. at
462-63. Thus, under Kodak, "a single brand could constitute a separate market." Image Technical
Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 3 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. 229, 229-30 (9th Cir. Aug. 26,
1997) (citing Kodak, 504 U.S. at 482 in upholding jury verdict against Kodak on remand from
Supreme Court).
216. Langston Corp. v. Standard Register Co., 553 F. Supp. 632, 638 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
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horizontal217 competitive substance of the defendants' conduct was
apparent.
Horizontally-induced terminations are similar in effect to other types
of conduct that the Court has deemed per se illegal. The per se illegality
of horizontal price fixing, for example, has been firmly established since
1927.218 Horizontally-induced terminations have the same adverse effects
on competition and thus should not be treated any less severely. In a
series of cases, the Court has made it clear that horizontal agreements
need not set specific prices or price levels in order to be per se illegal. An
indirect effect on price is sufficient to invoke the per se rule.219 When a
reseller induces a supplier to terminate a rival or sell to it upon
discriminatory terms, this has an indirect effect on pricing in the
intrabrand market. If the rival is completely eliminated from the market,
the remaining dealers will be freer to sell the supplier's products at a

217. In Klor's, for example, a retailer attempted to limit competition from a rival by inducing
suppliers not to sell to the firm or to sell only at discriminatory prices. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). Likewise, in GeneralMotors a group of dealers induced General
Motors not to deal with competing discounters. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127
(1966). As the Court pointed out in Northwest Wholesale:
[Tlhis Court has applied the per se approach... [to] joint efforts by a firm or firms to
disadvantage competitors by "either directly denying or persuading or coercing suppliers or
customers to deny relationships the competitors need in the competitive struggle".... In these
cases, the boycott often cut off access to a supply, facility, or market necessary to enable the
boycotted firm to compete.
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 294 (1985)
(quoting in part Lawrence A. Sullivan, The Law of Antitrust 261-62 (1977)); see also FTC v.
Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) (stating that "per se approach has generally
been limited to cases in which firms with market power boycott suppliers or customers in order to
discourage them from doing business with a competitor').
218. See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 649 (1980); United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,218 (1940); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 85 F. 271,
293 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
219. For example, in UnitedStates v. Socony- Vacuum Oil, competing oil companies had agreed to
purchase surplus gasoline in order to prevent prices from falling. Although the defendants did not
agree among themselves to sell gasoline at a particular price, the Court held that any combination
that "tampers with price structures" or interferes "vith the free play of market forces" should be per
se illegal. Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. at 221; see also Catalano,446 U.S. 643 (agreement among
wholesalers to terminate the practice of giving credit); National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (agreement among competitors to use specific method of quoting prices,
which operated as complete ban on competitive bidding); Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S.
553 (1936) (agreement to adhere to previously announced prices and terms of sale). As the Court
stated in UnitedStates v. General Motors Corp., "the per se rule applies even when the effect upon
prices is indirect." 384 U.S. 127, 147 (1966).
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higher price."0 If the rival is forced to pay a higher price or to purchase
on other less favorable terms, it will be less capable of engaging in
aggressive price competition. A rule of facial illegality is just as
appropriate for horizontally-induced terminations as for horizontal price
fixing, because such terminations have just as much potential for raising
prices. As one court has stated, "the coerced exclusion of discount rivals
from the market place solely because of their pricing policies" impairs
competition as much as explicit price fixing agreements.2"'
A horizontally-induced termination not only limits price competition
in the intrabrand market; it also eliminates non-price competition
between the inducing and terminated distributor. Thus, horizontal
terminations have an even greater adverse effect than horizontal price
fixing agreements." Indeed, horizontal terminations are most similar in
effect to horizontal territorial allocations. Courts have found such
arrangements to be particularly pernicious because they eliminate all
competition between the participating firms.2" Similarly, when a reseller
220. In In re Toys "R" Us, the FTC found that in inducing toy manufacturers not to sell to
warehouse clubs, Toys "R" Us was motivated by its fear that the clubs' low prices would require it
to lower its own prices. No. 9273, 1997 FTC LEXIS 284, at *18 (FrC Sept. 25, 1997). Indeed, Toys
"R" Us had already been forced to reduce its prices in areas where it competed with the warehouse
clubs. Id.
221. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse v. Belk Bros. Co., 621 F. Supp. 224,233 n.18 (S.D.N.Y.
1985). In fact, as Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent in Sharp, the termination of BEC had the
same competitive effect as would an express horizontal agreement between Hartwell and BEC to
maintain particular resale prices. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 740-41
(1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The per se rule would have applied to such an agreement and should
have applied to the termination of BEC. Similarly, Judge Mansfield argued in his dissenting opinion
in Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., that the per se rule should apply in such circumstances:
Before Oreck was terminated by the Sears-Whirlpool combination as a competing distributor,
the public had the benefit of Oreck's competition, including price competition, in the marketing
of Whirlpool cleaners.... After the termination the public could buy Whirlpool machines only
from Sears at such prices as Sears might decide, unaffected by any Oreck competition.
579 F.2d 126, 139 (2d Cir. 1978) (en bane) (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
222. As the Supreme Court stated in UnitedStates v. GeneralMotors:
The protection of price competition from conspiratorial restraint is an object of special solicitude
under the antitrust laws. We cannot respect that solicitude by closing our eyes to the effect upon
price competition of the removal from the market, by combination or conspiracy, of a class of
traders. Nor do we propose to construe the Sherman Act to prohibit conspiracies to fix prices at
which competitors may sell, but to allow conspiracies or combinations to put competitors out of
business entirely.
384 U.S. at 148.
223. See Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (holding per se illegal allocation of
territories among competing bar review courses); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596
(1972) (applying per se rule to horizontal territorial allocation); United States v. Cadillac Overall
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induces the termination of a competitor, the terminated firm will no

longer be able to compete on any basis, whether by lowering its prices or
improving its quality, and consumers will lose any opportunity to
purchase from the alternative source.

Like horizontal price fixing agreements and territorial allocations,
induced terminations eliminate a beneficial rivalry that otherwise would
exist between direct competitors. Indeed, terminations induced by
competing resellers have more severe anticompetitive consequences than
actions taken under horizontal dealer cartels. Cartels are difficult to
maintain for long periods of time. Cartel members are likely to attempt to
cheat on agreements requiring them to maintain particular prices or to
remain in certain territories.22 4 After such cheating begins, cartels usually
unravel quickly. Terminations of resellers, however, eliminate intrabrand

competition irrevocably. Once a reseller induces a supplier to terminate a
rival, the reseller need not face competition from that rival ever again.'
Thus, there is no economic reason to apply a more permissive approach
to such conduct than to other cartel-like behavior.
Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1089 (5th Cir. 1978) (applying per se rule to horizontal customer
allocation); United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 574 (2d Cir. 1961) (stating
that territorial allocation of markets is unreasonable per se).
224. In Sharp, the Supreme Court stated: "Cartels are neither easy to from nor easy to maintain.
Uncertainty over the terms of the cartel, particularly the prices to be charged in the future, obstructs
both formation and adherence by making cheating easier." Sharp, 485 U.S. at 727.
225. However, in a special circumstance, a dealer's inducement of a termination need not be
illegal. The courts have recognized that the "termination of one dealer in order to grant another
exclusive distribution rights in an area is generally considered lawful." Id at 746 n. I1 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Areeda, supra note 180, at 174-75). In applying the per se rule in Klor's, the
Court noted that it was not faced with "a case of... a manufacturer and a dealer agreeing to an
exclusive distributorship." Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
Several courts have agreed that "a company may contract with a new distributor and as a
consequence terminate its relationship with a former distributor without running afoul of the
Sherman Act, even if the effect of the new contract is to seriously damage the former distributor's
business." Motive Parts Warehouse v. Facet Enters., 774 F.2d 380, 386-87 (10th Cir. 1985) (citing
Dart Indus. v. Plunkett Co., 704 F.2d 496, 499 (10th Cir. 1983); Burdett Sound, Inc. v. Altec Corp.,
515 F.2d 1245, 1249 (5th Cir. 1975)); see also Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 19972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,956 (3d Cir. 1997); Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101,
1110 (7th Cir. 1984); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 131-34 (2d Cir. 1978) (en
bane); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418, 420-21 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
But see Zidell Explorations, Inc. v. Conval Int'l, 719 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir. 1983) (deeming per
se rule applicable when domestic distributor of valves induced foreign manufacturer to terminate
plaintiff as exclusive distributor and awarded distributorship to itself). The exclusive distributorship
rule is justified by the fact that, when one exclusive distributor is substituted for another, even as a
result of horizontal inducement from the new distributor, there is no net reduction of intrabrand
competition. It is also unlikely that the new dealer would have had sufficient market power to induce
the manufacturer to terminate an incumbent dealer it otherwise would have retained.
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The question remains, however, whether the facial illegality of
horizontal terminations is consistent with Monsanto and Sharp, where
the Court was so concerned with protecting suppliers against undue
liability for legitimate dealer terminations.226 The Court in Monsanto and
Sharp did not indicate that it intended to overrule its earlier antitrust
decisions. Lower federal courts, then, require a means of reconciling
Monsanto and Sharp with the Court's mixed group boycott, price fixing,
and territorial allocation cases. The ancillary restraints approach
proposed in this Article provides a framework for such a reconciliation.
The "but for" standard for dealer terminations would provide suppliers
with the protections the Court deemed necessary in Monsanto and Sharp.
Under such an approach, a supplier with a legitimate motive for
enhancing its interbrand efficiency could not be held liable for
terminating a reseller. 2 7 As required by Monsanto, a court would not be
able to infer the existence of an illegal conspiracy simply on the basis of
a supplier's receipt of complaints from its resellers. The "but for" test
would meet Monsanto's requirement for "evidence that tends to exclude
the possibility that the manufacturer and non-terminated distributors
were acting independently.""2 The plaintiff would have to prove that the
supplier had no independent purpose in terminating a reseller and that the
sole purpose of the termination was to accede to another reseller's
concerns about competition from a rival.229
It is easy to reconcile Sharp with the proposed analysis when more
than one reseller induces a supplier to terminate a rival. Indeed, in Sharp
the Court expressly reaffirmed its prior holdings in Klor's, General
Motors, and Topco on the per se illegality of broad horizontal restrictions
of intrabrand competition,' 0 and certain recent cases have construed
Sharp to require that distributor terminations induced by a group of
226. See supranotes 89-102 and accompanying text.
227. See supraPart V.C.2.
228. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763 (1984).
229. See supraPart V.C.2.
230. In fact, the Court's language supports using a horizontal/vertical dichotomy to analyze
distributor terminations:
This notion of equivalence between the scope of horizontal per se illegality and that of vertical
per se illegality was explicitly rejected in GTE Sylvania as it had to be, since a horizontal
agreement to divide territories is per se illegal while GTE Sylvania held that a vertical agreement
to do so is not.
Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 734 (1988) (citations omitted); see also
Liebeler, supranote 85, at 906-08.
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competitors be found illegal on their face as naked restraints of
intrabrand competition.23'
It is more difficult to reconcile Sharp with the proposed approach
when only a single reseller convinces a supplier to terminate a rival. The
Sharp Court found Business Electronics' termination to be vertical
because one competitor rather than several had issued an ultimatum to
Sharp. 23 2 Although this pedantic distinction bears no relationship to
economic effect, the Sharp Court was clear in its requirement that the
rule of reason should apply in single inducement cases. z3 The Court,
however, did not hold that terminations induced by single distributors
were legal. It merely found that a rule of reason rather than a per se
approach was appropriate. The Court also did not specify how the rule of
reason analysis should be conducted. The ancillary restraints analysis
proposed in this Article could qualify as the type of rule of reason
approach mandated by Sharp for single inducement cases.
Courts and antitrust enforcement agencies have begun to recognize
that the rule of reason need not be a unitary standard. The Department of
Justice, for example, recently advocated a "quick look" rule of reason
approach for horizontal restraints on price or output that have no
procompetitive benefits or justification. The Department concluded that
in such cases a plaintiff need not "prove actual anticompetitive effects or
define markets and show market power.", 34 In several recent cases the
Supreme Court has used an abbreviated rule of reason approach under
which it has precluded horizontal restrictions on price or output without
an extensive inquiry into the market power of the parties to the

231. See Lovett v. General Motors Corp., 769 F. Supp. 1506 (D. Minn. 1991), rev'd on other
grounds, 998 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1993). The court in Lovett was able to characterize the termination
as horizontal under Sharp because it was induced by several distributors. Id. at 1517. In Big Apple
BMW, Inc. v. BMW ofNorth America, Inc., the U.S. distributor for BMW automobiles had allegedly
denied the plaintiff's BMW dealership application because of pressure from several other dealers.
1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,918, at 68,389 (3d Cir. 1992). The court concluded that, under Sharp,
the dealers' action should be characterized as a per se illegal horizontal restraint rather than as a
vertical restraint subject to the rule of reason. Id. at 68,401-2. Similarly, in ES Development,Inc. v.
RWM Enterprises,Inc., several automobile dealers had requested a group of manufacturers to refuse
to franchise several other dealers at a nearby location. 1991-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,505, at
66,198-200 (8th Cir. 1991). In applying the per se rule, the court concluded that Sharp required that
a more stringent standard be applied to horizontal than to vertical conspiracies. Id.at 66,200-01.
232. Sharp, 485 U.S. at 730.
233. Id. at726-31.
234. Klein, supra note 118, at 5.
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restraints." Under such variations of the rule of reason, a restraint can be
found illegal without a market power analysis when its adverse
competitive effects are clear. Terminations induced by individual
resellers restrict intrabrand competition without any compensating
interbrand effects. Under the rule of reason, the courts need not attempt
the futile task of balancing the intrabrand and interbrand effects of an
induced dealer termination, because there are no beneficial interbrand
effects to weigh in the balance. When the plaintiff meets its burden
under the "but for" test and rebuts the presumption of a supplier's
vertical action, no further inquiry should be necessary. The market power
of the reseller would be evident from its success in inducing the supplier
to terminate one of its competitors. Even under a rule of reason approach,
the courts should require no further evidence once they confirm that
consumers have been deprived of intrabrand alternatives by a firm whose
only purpose is to avoid competition from a more efficient rival.
VI. APPLYING THE PROPOSED ANALYSIS TO THE
DISCON CASE
A recent case in the Second Circuit illustrates how the analysis
proposed in this Article can clarify the courts' approach to resellers'
refusals to deal. In Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., NYNEX, a monopoly
supplier of local telephone services in New York State, had allegedly
conspired, through its purchasing affiliate, to purchase removal services
for obsolete telephone equipment from AT&T Technologies at inflated
prices." AT&T Technologies allegedly agreed to falsify the real
transaction prices on invoices and to pay a secret rebate to NYNEX.
NYNEX was able to pass on the inflated prices to its captive customers
under the monopoly rate-setting procedure in New York. Discon, a
competitor of AT&T Services in the telephone equipment removal
market, claimed that the NYNEX affiliate and AT&T Services had
conspired to discontinue Discon as a NYNEX supplier because of its

235. See FTC v Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-64 (1986) (precluding association
of dentists from refusing to supply patients' x-rays to insurance companies seeking to evaluate
benefit claims); NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109-12 (1984) (precluding NCAA from
restricting number of times member schools' football teams could appear on television and
establishing amount each school could receive from television networks); National Soc'y of Profl
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-96 (1978) (precluding engineering society from banning
competitive bidding by engineering contractors).
236. 93 F.3d 1055 (2d Cir. 1996).
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refusal to go along with the pricing scheme. Because at the time of the
suit NYNEX held a monopoly over local telephone service in New York,
Discon had no alternative outlet for its telephone removal services, and it
was thus completely excluded from the telephone removal service market
when NYNEX agreed to purchase the services exclusively from AT&T
Technologies.
The Second Circuit concluded that, because Discon had claimed that
the purpose of choosing AT&T Technologies over Discon was "entirely
anti-competitive," Discon had possibly alleged a cause of action "under
the per se rule applied to group boycotts in Klor's."' The Supreme
28 and one of the critical
Court recently granted certiorari in Discon,"
issues before the Court will be whether a per se approach is appropriate
when only a single supplier and single purchaser agree not to deal with a
competitor of one of the parties. Many courts have been confused as to
which approach to apply under such circumstances. 239 Because such
conspiracies lack "horizontal plurality,"--more than one firm at the same
competitive level-many courts have deemed them vertical agreements
subject to a traditional rule of reason analysis. The Court in Sharp, for
example, characterized Business Electronics' termination as vertical
conduct because only a single firm induced the termination. 40
In Discon, the Second Circuit emphasized the horizontal competitive
effects of NYNEX's actions, stating that "an agreement between two
firms (e.g., [the NYNEX affiliate] and AT&T Technologies), even in a
vertical relationship, may be characterized as a horizontal restraint of
trade if the agreement seeks to disadvantage the direct competitor (e.g.,
237. Id. at 1061.
238. NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., No. 96-1570, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 1802 (Mar. 23, 1998).
239. In Tunis Bros. Co. v. FordMotorCo., the court described such confusion as follows:
In those situations where the termination of a distributor has allegedly occurred due to a
conspiracy between the supplier and one or more of its distributors, the courts have been
uncertain as to whether to apply the 'rule of reason' or the per se rule because, such cases have
both horizontal and vertical elements ....
The dilemma has been described as follows: "The actual termination of the distributor is
imposed vertically by the supplier, yet the inducement for the termination may come
horizontally from the complaining competitors of the terminated distributor. Thus, although the
form of such a 'mixed termination' conspiracy may be vertical, the competitive purpose and
effect of the conspiracy is more similar to horizontal conspiracies that exclude competitors of
the conspirators from a market."
763 F.2d 1482, 1497 n.24 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Piraino, Reformed Antitrust Approach, supra note
162, at 298), vacatedand remanded, 475 U.S. 1105 (1986).
240. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
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Discon) of one of the conspiring firms."24 ' The court pointed out that, in
Klor's, the agreements between the retailer and manufacturers designed
to disadvantage the retailer's competitor were "essentially vertical in
nature;" yet, the Supreme Court found a per se illegal group boycott
because "the intent and effect of these vertical agreements was a
horizontal market impact."242
The Second Circuit was correct in its conclusion that the purpose of
NYNEX's refusal to deal, and not the outward form of the conspiracy
between NYNEX and AT&T Technologies, should be determinative. As
a monopolist in the local telephone market, NYNEX controlled a facility
to which Discon had to have access in order to compete in the telephone
removal services market. Therefore, the court appropriately required
NYNEX to demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for its refusal to
deal. The purpose alleged by Discon-its refusal to participate in
NYNEX's illegal pricing scheme-certainly would not qualify as a
proper justification. If no other motive is proven at trial, NYNEX should
be held liable for unlawfully denying Discon the ability to sell removal
services to the New York telephone market. Such a purpose bears no
relationship to the legitimate objectives of the purchasing relationship
between NYNEX and AT&T Technologies.243 Like other per se illegal
group boycotts, such a naked refusal to deal has no purpose except
stifling competition.244
When monopoly purchasers like Discon are unable to prove a
legitimate business purpose for their refusal to deal, the courts need not
further inquire into the competitive effects of their conduct. In Discon,
the plaintiff allegedly was excluded from the market simply because it

241. Discon, 93 F.3d at 1060 (citing Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 131-32 & n.6
(2d Cir. 1978) (en banc)).
242. Id. at 1061.
243. Similarly, the Government has alleged in its current case against Microsoft Corporation that
the company violated the Sherman Act by denying Netscape Corporation's Internet browser equal
access to the Windows operating system. See Complaint in United States v. Microsoft Corp., at 1-13
(D.D.C. 1998) (No. 98-1232), (visited June 21, 1998) <http:llwww.usdoj.govlatr/cases3/micros/
1763.htm>. The Government claims that Microsoft's exclusionary conduct should be illegal on its
face, because it lacks any legitimate business justification. See Memorandum of the United States in
Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 42-48, Microsoft (No. 98-1232) (on file with
author). For a discussion of how the essential facilities doctrine should apply to the Microsoft
controversy, see Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Remedy for Monopoly Leveraging by
ElectronicNetworks, 93 Nw. L. Rev. 1 (1998).
244. Oreck, 579 F.2d at 131 (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263
(1963)).
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refused to over-charge for its services. As a result of Discon's exclusion
from the market, consumers were forced to pay higher prices for
telephone services because NYNEX passed on the inflated costs of its
preferred supplier in the rate-setting process. No anti-competitive
conduct more directly implicates the central purposes of the Sherman Act
than the exclusion of a low-price competitor from a market. Monopoly
purchasers like Discon should not be permitted to engage in such
conduct unless the conduct promotes some legitimate business purpose.
Given the pernicious nature of the conspiracy between NYNEX and
AT&T Technologies, it would be appropriate for the trial court to find
NYNEX liable without any further inquiry if it is unable to meet its
initial burden ofjustifying the refusal to deal. 45
Such a purpose-based standard constitutes neither a traditional per se
nor rule of reason approach. Instead of using the presence or absence of
horizontal plurality as a means of choosing between a harsh per se and a
permissive rule of reason analysis, courts should adopt the ancillary
restraints approach described in this Article. The relevant issue in refusal
to deal cases involving essential facilities such as the NYNEX telephone
system is not whether the parties to the agreement are in a horizontal or
vertical relationship, but whether the refusal to deal was effected for
legitimate or anti-competitive purposes. A refusal to deal effected by a
single supplier and single purchaser can be every bit as anticompetitive
as a refusal to deal induced by a group of competing purchasers or
suppliers at the same level of the distribution chain. If one or more
essential suppliers and one or more essential purchasers agree to refuse to
deal with a third party in order to promote the legitimate purposes of
their distribution relationship, the refusal to deal should be upheld as an
ancillary restraint. If, however, the parties decide to refuse to deal with a
third party for anti-competitive reasons, the refusal to deal should be
precluded as a naked competitive restraint, regardless of the number of
conspirators at each level of the distribution chain.
Distinguishing between refusals to deal involving one and those
involving several purchasers or suppliers amounts to the type of
"formalistic line drawing" the Supreme Court condemned in Sylvania.24
245. In their amicus curiae brief opposing the U.S. Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Discon,
the U.S. Department of Justice and FTC proposed that NYNEX should be required to establish a procompetitive justification for its refusal to deal before the plaintiff was required to prove any anticompetitive effects. See Amicus Curiae Brief for the United States and Federal Trade Commission at
16-17, NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., No. 96-1570, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 1802 (Mar. 23, 1998).
246. See supranote 81 and accompanying text
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Courts should recognize that refusals to deal effected by individual firms
to disadvantage direct competitors are "purportedly vertical arrangements
'
which are actually horizontal agreements in disguise."247
There is no
substantive competitive difference between a refusal to deal effected by
one party at a particular level of the distribution chain and one that is
effected by several. 48 If, for example, a single purchaser refuses to buy
from a supplier for an anti-competitive purpose, that refusal to deal may
have no less of an adverse effect on competition than a refusal
undertaken by a group of purchasers. Indeed, a refusal to deal effected
by a single purchaser that controls an essential facility will have a much
more significant adverse effect than a refusal to deal undertaken by a
group of less consequential purchasers. A supplier may be completely
foreclosed from the relevant market by a single essential purchaser's
refusal to deal, while it may still have sufficient outlets for its products if
a group of smaller buyers refuses to purchase from it. A refusal to deal
by a single purchaser should therefore not be treated any less stringently
than one by several purchasers.
Although the relevant relationship in Discon was vertical in the sense
that it involved two parties at different distribution levels, its substantive
competitive impact was horizontal because it arbitrarily excluded a
competitor of one of the parties from the relevant market. There would
have been no question about the illegality of the defendants' conduct
under group boycott precedent if more than one purchaser or supplier
had agreed to participate in the refusal to deal with Discon. The
exclusion of Discon from the market should be no less illegal because
only a single supplier and single purchaser were able to exclude Discon
from the relevant market. Just as the Supreme Court was not diverted by
the outward vertical form of the conspiracy in Klor's, the Second Circuit
in Discon appreciated the horizontal competitive substance of conduct
designed to exclude a direct competitor of one of the conspirators from
the relevant market.
An agreement between NYNEX and AT&T Technologies to refuse to
deal with Discon would not constitute a type of non-price vertical
247. Construction Aggregate Transp., Inc. v. Florida Rock Indus., Inc., 710 F.2d 752, 775-76
(1 th Cir. 1983). The Eleventh Circuit stated in that case that such an arrangement "represents one of
the most dangerous threats to competition, since it can have few purposes other than requiring the
manufacturer to restrict output." Id. at 776.
248. As the court stated in Langston Corp. v. StandardRegister Co., "[tihe classic boycott usually
involves a plurality of actors at the targeted levels. But a per se violation can occur with only one
participant at the target's level." 553 F. Supp. 632, 638 (W.D. Ga. 1982).
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restraint to which a Sylvania rule of reason approach should apply. The
restriction on dealing with Discon was not imposed by a supplier upon a
reseller in order to promote its efficiency in the interbrand market. The
Sylvania Court's solicitude for protecting interbrand competition thus
was irrelevant in Discon. Rather than constituting an attempt to enhance
the effectiveness of the parties' distribution relationship, the conduct in
Discon was nothing more than a naked attempt to exclude a price-cutting
competitor from the relevant market.
The Second Circuit's decision in Discon is consistent with group
boycott cases such as Klor's, and also with the federal courts' essential
facilities cases. In certain of those cases a single entity controlled a
facility essential to effective competition in a particular market. The
courts held that the entity controlling the essential facility had the burden
of proving a legitimate business justification for refusing to make the
facility available to all competitors on equal terms. Defendants who
failed to meet that burden were forced to deal with all qualified third
parties that sought to use the facilities. For example, in MCI
Communications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., the
Seventh Circuit required AT&T to allow MCI, one of its competitors in
the long-distance telephone market, to interconnect with the local "Bell"
telephone facilities (which at the time of the suit were still owned by
AT&T).24 9 The Seventh Circuit characterized the local telephone lines as
an essential facility and found that AT&T had no legitimate business
reason for denying MCI access to those lines. NYNEX's local telephone
facilities were no less essential to the plaintiff in Discon, and it should
have the burden ofjustifying its refusal to deal.
VII. CONCLUSION
While courts have well-developed theories of acceptable competitive
conduct for sellers and consumers, no general theory for the analysis of
conduct at the intermediate resale level has yet emerged. Indeed, to date,
the federal courts' approach to resellers' conduct has been formalistic
and inconsistent. As a result, retailers, dealers and other resellers have
become confused about the extent to which they can exercise their
market power. The lack of clear guidance has become more critical in
recent years as resellers' market power and leverage over their suppliers
has increased. This Article proposes a new theory for the analysis of the
249. 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1982).
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antitrust implications of resellers' conduct. The theory is based on wellaccepted antitrust principles, and it can be adopted by federal courts
without contradicting recent Supreme Court precedents. The ancillary
restraints approach described in this Article will allow courts to focus on
the economic substance of resellers' conduct and to confirm the legality
of such conduct after only a minimal inquiry. Such an approach will
conserve judicial resources while encouraging resellers to engage in procompetitive conduct and deterring them from using their market power to
limit the range of alternative products, prices and services available to
consumers.
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